Hyderabad's Relations

with

the Dominion of India

Volume II

Prepared by the Government of

His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar

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FOREWORD

This second volume of documents takes the story of Hyderabad's relations with India from the beginning of April, 1948, until the departure of Lord Mountbatten from India on the conclusion of his term of office as Governor-General on June 21, 1948. It tells of Hyderabad's willingness for arbitration and a plebiscite and of India's rejection of those offers—a rejection finally and starkly explained on June 17 when the Indian Prime Minister proclaimed that India demanded that Hyderabad should either accede to the Indian Union or accept India's paramountcy.

For the understanding of the documents that follow it is necessary to take a brief glance into history. For a century and more Hyderabad remained under British protection against external aggression and internal disorder. In 1947 Britain decided to withdraw her rule from India and, in so doing, unilaterally denounced her treaties with Hyderabad and her obligations under them. But the Nizam of Hyderabad was promised freedom of choice to determine the future of his State: he could accede to either of the new Horn Dominions of India or Pakistan or he could remain independent.

The Nizam chose independence. Many factors influenced his decision. His State covers more than 82,000 square miles and is larger than the United Kingdom. His subjects number some 17,000,000, more than the population of Canada, Australia or any other British Dominion outside the Indian sub-continent. Hyderabad has its own Government, its own currency, railways, airways, posts, telephones and telegraphs system: it is a country, organised as a country. The overriding consideration that weighed with the Nizam, however, was his desire to maintain Hyderabad's tradition of unity and friendship between all classes of the population—a unity that the Nizam felt would be imperilled if he were to align himself with either of the Dominions which partition of British India on a communal basis had created.

While choosing independence, the Nizam expressed his desire to co-operate to the full with India, whose territories surround Hyderabad. He offered to negotiate with India on any basis outside accession to that Dominion. Discussions in the latter half of 1947 failed to produce a final agreement on the eventual nature of the association, but on

November 29, Hyderabad and India entered into Standstill Agreement for one year.

That Agreement, unfortunately, did not fulfil the hopes raised by its conclusion. India charged Hyderabad with breaches of the understanding. Hyderabad made counter-charges. The Nizam's Government pointed out that India, in contravention of its express commitments, had not supplied to the Hyderabad police and Army weapons and munitions urgently needed for internal security and to deal with subversive elements creating trouble in the border areas. India had taken no measures to prevent border raids or to discourage anti-Hyderabad activities from bases in its territory. India had promised to provide all facilities for import and export trade to Hyderabad, but, on the contrary, had imposed a severe economic blockade on the State. Consistent with its policy of promoting friendly relations with India, however, Hyderabad suggested that all differences should be referred to arbitration as provided for in the Standstill Agreement itself.

The proposal for arbitration was made in a letter dated April 5, 1948, from the Prime Minister of Hyderabad (Mir Laik Ali) to the Prime Minister of India (Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru)—and with that letter the first volume of documents ended. The documents here published show the further efforts made by Hyderabad to secure a settlement and will enable the world to fix responsibility for the present situation.

The Government of India refused to accept arbitration. They argued that, as arbitration "would take up all that remains of the period of one year for which the agreement is to run," there would be little scope for implementation of the award of the arbitrator. They also declined to regard arbitration "as a practical solution" unless the Hyderabad Government would take certain steps which the Government of India proposed. Hyderabad, having sought recourse to arbitration under the terms of the Standstill Agreement itself, could not agree that the Government of India could make that recourse conditional on Hyderabad's agreeing to take certain action.

Once again, Hyderabad's Prime Minister emphasised Hyderabad's desire to maintain the most friendly and cordial relations with the Indian Union. "Given the opportunity," he wrote, "Hyderabad is anxious to become India's faithful friend, useful ally and helpful neighbour."

In the meantime the Nizam had made an announcement concerning constitutional reform in his Dominions. Indian leaders, including the Indian Prime Minister and some of his Cabinet colleagues, had repeatedly

linked demands for "responsible government" in Hyderabad and a decision on Hyderabad's future status "by the will of the people" with the official Government of India terms for a settlement. Although internal affairs of Hyderabad are no concern of the Government of India, the Nizam's Government discussed them informally with India in order to facilitate an amicable settlement. On April 22 the Nizam issued a *Firman* expressing his intention to associate representatives of the important sections in the country with the framing of a new constitution. "Until such time as these proposals are formulated and a new Government based on these proposals is formed," he said, "I trust that those political parties which are not represented in the present interim Government will join and take proper share in shouldering the responsibilities of Government."

The State Congress, which had declined to allow its members to stand for election to the Legislative Assembly and many of whose adherents had been indulging in subversive activities, once again failed to respond to his call. The plan for the reconstitutions of the Government, therefore, could not be fulfilled.

All this time Indian newspapers had been full of propaganda hostile to Hyderabad and the so-called "problem" of Hyderabad's future was brought even more prominently before the Indian public through its discussion by the All-India Congress Committee session in Bombay at the end of April. The Government of India, said Pandit Nehru at that meeting, wished to apply to Hyderabad the same principle as in the case of Kashmir, Junagadh and other States—that the wish of the people of the State should ultimately prevail. He was reported to have said that "there were two courses open to Hyderabad—war or accession." At a Press Conference in New Delhi on May 1, however, he denied having used these words, saying that his real statement was that Hyderabad must have the closest possible relations with India or else there would be conflict. The Indian Union, he added, could not possibly tolerate any part of Indian territory inside or on its borders being potentially capable of being made into foreign bases: Hyderabad, therefore, must necessarily form part of the Indian Union. But India had never talked in terms of forcing any State to accede by military methods. The Indian Government, reiterated Pandit Nehru, had talked in terms of the people deciding the issue by a plebiscite or referendum.

Pandit Nehru also referred to the necessity for peace on the Indo-Hyderabad borders. Frontier raids into Hyderabad territory had been increasing and Hyderabad had frequently complained that efforts to

restore order had been frustrated by the failure of neighbouring Provincial Governments to co-operate Indeed, raiders making forays into Hyderabad territory had included uniformed and armed personnel of tne Indian police. Both before and after the conclusion of the Standstill Agreement the Prime Minister of Hyderabad tried to arrange conferences with the Prime Ministers of neighbouring Provinces in an endeavour to secure joint action to deal with border unrest. The date and venue of meetings with Ministers of the Central Provinces and Madras had actually been fixed when the Nizam's Government were informed that the question would be taken up after the Agent-General for India in Hyderabad had assumed office. The matter was again raised by a Hyderabad delegation when they met the Governor-General of India on March 4, 1948, and the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of States undertook to suggest to Provincial Ministers that they should tour border districts with the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. On March 25 a letter was sent to the Secretary of the Ministry of States asking if the arrangements had been made, but no reply to it was ever received.

May witnessed serious deterioration in Indo-Hyderabad affairs. While political contact was maintained between the two Governments and the Governor-General of India (Lord Mountbatten) was active in attempting to bring about a settlement, tension along the borders increased and India's propaganda campaign against Hyderabad became more virulent. Serious outrages against Muslims travelling to and from Hyderabad by train were perpetrated at Dudhni, a station just over the border in the Sholapur District. Because of the tension raised in Gulbarga by these outrages, a minor incident occurred at the Ghangapur railway station, in Hyderabad territory, on May 22. This incident, in which no one was killed, was followed by the immediate severance of through railway passenger communications between India and Hyderabad.

News of the Ghangapur incident was given to the Indian people through their newspapers on May 23, the very day that Hyderabad's Prime Minister returned to New Delhi to continue negotiations with the Government of India. The documents here tell of the course of those negotiations and of those that followed. Hyderabad agree to align its policy with that of India on the subjects of defence, external affairs and communications, the Nizam promising to pass the necessary parallel laws if the Hyderabad legislature failed to do so. The Nizam also agreed to determined whether his people desired to remain independent or to accede to India through a plebiscite conducted under the general supervision of an impartial outside organisation, such as the United Nations or the International Court of Justice.

India, as stated above, had frequently declared that the will of the Hyderabad people should prevail. But, when the Nizam offered to abide by the verdict of his people, India did not consider it enough. The Government of India demanded immediate accession in substance, leaving only that decision to be confirmed by a plebiscite. They demanded the immediate introduction of "responsible government" on lines laid down by them. They demanded the right to station troops in Hyderabad whenever India declared any state of emergency. And they declined to concede even in principal economic and fiscal freedom to Hyderabad. The Nizam's Government refused to bow before this attitude of "dictation and coercion" and intimidation—and the neogotiations ended on June 17.

That same evening Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru for the first time officially confessed to India's true aim—Hyderabad must accede or acknowledge Indian paramountcy. He also proclaimed that the already stringent economic blockade would be further intensified.

Economic sanctions to force Hyderabad to agree to India's demands had been applied both before and after the signing of the Standstill Agreement. Lord Mountbatten, in a letter to the Nizam as late as April 8, repeated assurances that "to the best of my knowledge and belief, Pandit Nehru and other Ministers of the Central Government of India have in no way been parties to any policy of applying economic pressure on Hyderabad." But, in spite of assurances, impediments to the flow of commodities into Hyderabad went on. In the following pages is reproduced correspondence relating to the stoppage of salt consignments. These letters have been included as a typical example. Many other commodities besides salt have been affected and protests by the Nizam's Government have gone unheeded. The relevant documents have not been published merely because their inclusion would make this collection too bulky.

Today Hyderabad is facing a total blockade and the very necessities of life, including salt and medical supplies, are being denied to its people. An organised propaganda campaign has been launched against Hyderabad and its borders are being violated. Reference will be found in the following pages to an incident in which five uniformed constables of the Indian police were killed. The Bombay Government reported to the Government of India that Hyderabad nationals had been responsible for the attack. A joint inquiry conducted by officers of the Government of India and the Nizam's Government—the findings of which were received as this volume went to Press—fixes the blame squarely on Indian subjects, who trespassed into Hyderabad territory.

Despite all these provocations, Hyderabad has not deviated from the path of peaceful negotiation and remains prepared for an honourable agreement with India. To quote the Nizam's own words in his telegram to Lord Mountbatten of June 17, "I earnestly hope that negotiations will be continued and a settlement reached in a very short time."

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DOCUMENTS.

Letter, dated April 5, 1948, from His Exalted Highness the Nizam to His Excellency the Governor-General of the Dominion of India.

Information, which has reached me in Hyderabad, gives me reason to think that the letter addressed to my Prime Minister by your States Ministry was in the nature of an ultimatum to be regarded as a prelude to an open breach of friendly relations. I am therefore making a final appeal to you to exercise your good offices to prevent such a contingency.

2. I was glad when at the end of November, 1947, the Standstill Agreement was finally executed, because I thought that, if a working arrangement continued for a year or so with good-will on both sides, suspicion would diminish and that in the light of experience the Dominion would discover that some form of association, other than accession, was after all practicable and satisfactory.

3. Unhappily hitherto the Standstill Agreement has not worked smoothly. But the situation can be remedied and our original hopes revived. There are difficulties in interpreting the obligations imposed by the Agreement and in ascertaining the obligations which are continued by it. Moreover, the fact that the Agreement specifically excludes paramountcy, so that whatever followed directly and exclusively from the relationship and was not covered by any agreement or administrative arrangement, is no longer in force, involves further complication. But these difficulties can be solved, as was contemplated in the Agreement itself, by arbitration.

4. The letter to which I have referred, from your States Ministry to my Prime Minister sets out a summary list of alleged breaches of varying importance, some of them introduced for the first time. But in the discussions which you had with my delegation in Delhi at the beginning of March you said that the so-called Pakistan loan and the currency regulation confining cash transactions in my State to my own currency, were the principal obstacles to good-will. In the case of the loan, my Government have taken the action which you yourself suggested and I have every hope that it will be effective. So far as the currency regulation is concerned, my Prime Minister agreed at the Delhi Conference to amend it, in order to take the sting out of it, by

making it inapplicable to travellers for their *bona fide* requirements. The necessary amendment has since been made and published.

5. What has concerned me has been that, whereas the British regularly supplied me with arms and equipment, I have had no arms, equipment or ammunition whatever for my Forces or Police since July 1947. I have constantly pressed your Government and Your Excellency on this subject but while your Government have objected to my getting my requirements from other sources, they have supplied me with nothing themselves, with the result that I have been gravely embarrassed both in training my troops and in maintaining law and order.

6. An equally tense situation has been created by the Government of India in relation to the trade, commerce and economic life of Hyderabad. On many occasions I expressed to you, through Sir Walter Monckton and others, my apprehension that, if I chose, as I had been assured I could, to remain independent, the Government of India would seek to coerce me into accession by an economic boycott or even by finding some excuse to invade my territories. In paragraph 2 of your letter to me dated the 12th August, 1947, you used these words " I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile act by the Dominion and your State might be subjected to blockade, but I am satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying such pressure." You sent me assurances on several later occasions that you would never be a party to any improper pressure on the State and that you had received the necessary assurances from your Ministers. I must tell Your Excellency frankly that, in spite of these assurances and in spite of the Standstill Agreement, economic pressure has in fact been applied on Hyderabad with growing intensity from the time when the British left. There is no manner of doubt that it is in full force today. Even medicines, medical stores and hospital requisites are being held up and chlorine for the water supply of my people. Of all this my Government have in their possession documentary evidence. There are many Britishers and other foreigners who have been in the State in recent months and can confirm what I say of their own knowledge. Nor has it been seriously challenged by the officers of your Government. I have hitherto made no public protest, but if it is now intended to create an open breach of friendly relations, I can no longer remain silent. Whatever differences of opinion there may be on the question of Hyderabad's decision in present circumstances not to accede, the world must know the way in which Hyderabad has been treated.

7. In 1947 the British Government unilaterally denounced the

Treaties between them and my State. I wonder if Your Excellency remembers my letter to you as Crown Representative dated the 9th July, 1947. I attach a copy together with a copy of the only reply I ever received to it. I have hitherto refrained from publishing these documents but now I must release them. Will history say that the British were content to sacrifice their tried friends because they had too little nuisance value ?

8. The world must know how, between them, the British Government and the new Government of India—I do not seek to apportion blame—have denied fulfilment of the promise that I should be free to choose either whether to accede or to remain independent.

9. I appeal to Your Excellency, after the assurances you have given me, not to be a party to the imposition of economic pressure on me and my State. I even hear in Hyderabad that forces of the Indian Army are being moved and stationed round the borders of my State and I cannot but ask for what purpose these troop concentrations are taking place. Your Excellency's Government must know that there can be no intention of offensive action by Hyderabad against the Indian Union. I must warn Your Excellency that, if the policy of attempted coercion is persisted in, I gravely fear that ultimately the peace not only of Hyderabad but of the whole of South India will be endangered.

10. Last year the British, without consulting me, severed all the ties which bound my State to the King Emperor. Will Your Excellency not keep faith with me now ? To break faith with the weak causes perhaps less immediate disadvantage than to break faith with the strong, but assuredly in the end it brings its retribution. I hope Your Excellency will forgive me for this frank and honest expression of my feelings and sentiments.

ENCLOSURE.

Letter, dated July 15, 1947, from His Excellency the Crown Representative to His Exalted Highness the Nizam :

I have forwarded a copy of Your Exalted Highness' letter of 9th July to His Majesty's Government and hope to let Your Exalted Highness have a reply shortly.

Letter, dated April 8, 1948, from His Excellency the Governor-General of India to His Exalted Highness the Nizam.

Sir Walter Monckton brought me your letter of 5th April. I hope that you will treat this reply to certain points which you raised in it on a strictly personal basis. As you well know, I am now a constitutional Governor-General, and my official views are those of my Government. I thought, nevertheless, that a useful purpose might perhaps be served if I were to convey to you some of my own personal feelings and thoughts on the present situation. I know not only that you will treat these with the confidence which, I feel sure you will agree, they deserve ; but also that you will take full account of what I have to say both as a friend of Hyderabad's, as a well-wisher for the lasting peace and prosperity of this sub-continent as a whole, and as one who has personally always believed in, and will continue to believe in, constitutional monarchy as the best form of Government in this troubled world.

(2) I would first say that I fully shared your gladness, to which your refer in your letter, when the Standstill Agreement between India and Hyderabad was executed at the end of November, 1947. I, too, hoped that the satisfactory working of this agreement, with good-will on both sides, would result, on its termination, in the ground being prepared for the formulation of a permanent close association between India and Hyderabad. This hope was fully shared by my Government. Nobody could be more distressed than I that the agreement has, for various reasons, not worked smoothly. No one could be keener than I that a full measure of good-will should return, and that Hyderabad's relations with India should, at the earliest practicable moment, be put on a permanent basis as a result of renewed negotiations in a spirit of friendship.

(3) I am firmly of the belief that this spirit would have prevailed from the commencement of the Standstill Agreement, and that you and I would be seeing it grown even now, if only that most unfortunate incident, which took place in Your Exalted Highness's capital city on the night of 27th October, had not occurred. I refer to the occasion when your Delegation, of which the Nawab of Chhatari (your Prime Minister at that time), Sir Sultan Ahmed, Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, and Sir Walter Monckton, were then members, were unfortunately unable to leave Hyderabad for Delhi as intended. I need not enter into the full details of this incident, and the part which the police played in it. These facts are as well known to Your Exalted Highness as they are to me. But I must reiterate my firm belief that, if these methods of coercion had not been permitted to interfere with the carrying out of Your Exalted Highness's wishes at so crucial a moment,

the story of relations between India and Hyderabad would have been written by a very different and far happier pen.

(4) I feel that it is my duty to set Your Exalted Highness's mind at rest on one point. You refer to assurances, which I have given to you in the past, that I would never be a party to improper pressure on your State. These assurances remain as good today as when they were given. Never will I, the constitutional Governor-General of India, be a party to any such procedure.

(5) You refer particularly to paragraph 2 of my letter of 12th August, 1947, in which I said : " I learn that Your Exalted Highness is concerned lest a decision not in present circumstances to accede would be treated as a hostile act by the Dominion and your State might be subject to blockade, but I am satisfied that the leaders of the new Dominion have no intention of applying such pressure." I can now once more assure you that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, Pandit Nehru and the other Ministers of the Central Government of India have in no way been parties to any policy of applying economic pressure on Hyderabad. I do not know whether you have ever met Pandit Nehru : if you had, I do not believe that you would allow any accusation of the nature you imply to be levelled against him.

(6) But this I must make clear to you. These assurances were given at time when both my Government and yours were united in the resolve to make the Standstill Agreement work. I can assure you that such a resolve still holds the field, so far as the Government of India are concerned. But certain events have supervened which make it very much more difficult for the same neighbourly feelings, as then existed, to exist today.

(7) You will have noticed that during the course of the last few months, the Ruler of nearly every State in this sub-continent which is in relationship with the Dominion of India has introduced, or has declared his intention of introducing in the near future, truly responsible and representative Government. I say 'nearly every State' for there is one exception—Hyderabad. It is impossible for any fair-minded person in the outside world, to view the present Government of Hyderabad but as one representing, and indeed dominated by, a party which commands the support of only a part of the minority community in the State; nor, to the best of my knowledge, is it responsible to the Legislature.

(8) I do not personally believe that friendly relations between India and Hyderabad, which we are agreed are the necessary prelude to a satisfactory long-term settlement, can come so long as the state of

affairs to which I have referred above exists. I am not saying this as Governor-General of India. I am saying it as an impartial observer and as a well-wisher of Hyderabad.

(9) I therefore believe that the ability to take the first step towards arresting the present downward trend in the relationship between India and Hyderabad—and arresting it before it goes too far for hope of improvement—and towards starting that amelioration in the relationship which will, we all hope, end in permanent amity, rests in Your Exalted Highness's hands. If you could now see your way to introducing a Government truly representative of the desires and aspirations of your people as a whole, I believe that you will do a great service to the future of the whole of this sub-continent.

(10) I shall not deal, in this letter, with the controversy which is at present taking place over certain details of implementation and interpretation of the Standstill Agreement. That, I am sure you will realise, is a matter for my Government to deal with and one in which I have no part. But I repeat that I believe that the ability to take the first step towards bringing about the spirit of friendship in which the Agreement can be made to work is yours and yours alone.

(11) You sent me with your letter a copy of a letter which you wrote to me as Crown Representative on 9th July, 1947, and the only reply that you have ever received thereto. I have investigated this matter and it appears that the reason why a further reply was not sent lay in an error of staff work in the Political Department here. Owing to the enormous pressure under which all concerned were working at the time, it was possible for such an error to have occurred. That it should have happened in connection with so important a document is, I admit, unfortunate.

(12) Finally, let me tell you that, in the same way as you say that there is no intention of offensive action by Hyderabad against the Indian Union, there is no intention of offensive action by the Indian Union againt Hyderabad. I will end with this thought. Let us *not* believe that, however serious a situation may become, there is nothing that can be done to retrieve it, and that all we can do is fatalistically to await the worst. I will continue to do my best. I have told you how I think you could help.

Letter, dated April 10, 1948, from the Prime Minister of Hyderabad to the Prime Minister of India.

I confirm having sent you a telegram today reading as under:—

"Sir Walter Monckton brought with him yesterday a cutting from the Hindustan Times dated seventh April displaying in prominent headlines Qasim Razvi's call for Jehad and reproducing speech said to have been made on thirtyfirst March (STOP) Last night's Delhi Radio announced that there were questions in Union Parliament regarding the alleged speech and you very rightly expressed your indignation over it (STOP) We have carefully checked on the matter and find there was nothing like Hyderabad Weapon Week nor was there any mass rally nor any mass meeting at any place in Hyderabad nor did Qasim Razvi make any speech either on the date stated in the article or during the week prior to that date or the week subsequent to that date (STOP) No report either of such a meeting or any such speech appeared in any Muslim or Hindu newspaper in Hyderabad or in any other important newspaper in India nor do any of the various News Agencies represented in Hyderabad seem to have had any knowledge of any such meeting or speech (STOP) It is significant that the speech and the meeting reported to have taken place on thirtyfirst March are given as communicated to Hindustan Times from Hyderabad on sixth April and it appears in the issue of seventh the precise day when Sir Walter Monckton was to discuss Hyderabad issues with Governor-General and your goodself (STOP) I cannot resist the conclusion that this was a deliberately false report publication of which was carefully designed and timed to damage Indo-Hyderabad relations and prevent possibility of reaching friendly understanding (STOP) If a speech couched in the terms alleged in the article had been made I should resent it equally with you but since the whole story is without foundation I rely on your sense of fair play to see that truth is known and to take any steps which may be open to you against such a mischievous manoeuvre and to prevent its repetition (STOP) Subject to your consent I propose to release copy of this telegram to the Press."

I need hardly emphasise how damaging I consider the publication of the faked article referred to. I do hope the matter will receive v serious consideration.

Letter, dated April 22, 1948, from His Exalted Highness the Nizam to His Excellency the Governor-General of India.

Laik Ali and Sir Walter Monckton on their return have presented to me a full account of the several discussions that took place in Delhi during their recent visit and have also conveyed their impressions to me. I feel greatly disappointed that the atmosphere of suspicion has not yet been cleared up and a common basis for an understanding could not unfortunately be found so far. But I am nevertheless most grateful to Your Excellency for the great personal interest you have taken in the proceedings and the efforts you have made to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

(2) It has been conveyed to me that you believe that in the absence of accession the Government of India feel that they would not be able to withstand the pressure of public opinion which, I daresay, has been aroused as a result of the adverse propaganda which has been persistently carried on against Hyderabad for some time. As an alternative to accession, the announcement of Responsible Government as an immediate aim and certain other measures have been suggested with the object of satisfying public opinion in the Indian Union and a hint has been dropped that an announcement from me on the eve of the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee to be held on the 24th of this month would be desirable. It is difficult for me to consider any suggestion emanating from an outside authority bearing on the constitutional relationship between the Ruler and the people of this State, which should be viewed purely as an internal affair. However, since there are certain measures which I have already decided to take. I am announcing them through a *Firman*. I am enclosing a translation of the *Firman* for your perusal. I hope my announcement will also be of some help in improving the situation on your side.

(3) In conclusion, I must frankly state here that I have to keep the situation in the State fully in view in dealing with the affairs here as otherwise, I fear, I would be prejudicing my principal objective, namely, peace and harmony in the country which it is absolutely necessary to maintain at all cost.

Firman, dated April 22, by His Exalted Highness the Nizam.

(1) The revolutionary changes that have taken place during the past two years in India may have their own justifications ; but, bearing in mind the great traditions of tolerance and mutual amity among the different communities which have ever been a source of pride to all

sections of the people of these Dominions, it has pained me greatly to see that, of late, the feelings of the various communities in India have tended to become separatist and that every part of the country more or less has been affected by this tendency. In spite of this it has been my constant endeavour to see that the different sections of the people of my Dominions keep away, as far as possible, from the harmful effects of the poisonous atmosphere and preserve the precious heritage of good-will and amity handed down to them by their forefathers.

(2) It was this very idea that was in my mind when giving effect to the proposals for closer association between the Government and the people. Moreover, it was for the same reason that I decided after the division of India that Hyderabad should not become a part of either Dominion. Hyderabad could only then be able, without giving cause for dissatisfaction to any important group of people in Hyderabad, to present an example to the world which would be worthy of emulation and would progress economically and politically with harmony and concord between all sections. This is my opinion even now and I desire to keep the attention of my beloved people directed to the fact that they are all the children of one motherland and that they should serve her in a spirit of unity and brotherliness. It has been the age-long tradition of my House to regard all classes of the inhabitants of my State as equal and to treat them all alike without showing favour to any particular group. I trust, by the grace of God, that this will remain so in the future.

(3) Keeping in view the correctness of this golden principle, it is also undeniable that in these rapidly changing times it is very necessary while completely safeguarding their best traditions, for Government to obtain the greatest possible co-operation from the people in economic and administrative matters, so that the representatives of important sections of the people may in a large measure assume responsibility for the administration of the State and they may thereby fulfil their aspirations of service to the country under the aegis of the Rule, I have never been in the past, nor am I today, opposed to this trend of thought. But both from my experience of administration and of the special conditions existing in the State, I have certainly felt apprehensive that mere imitation of the form of government elsewhere might poison the atmosphere of our country in the same way as it is doing in other places. Besides, while it should be our endeavour that our relation with the Government of India be cordial and friendly, our distinctive position and dignity should not be affected at the same time.

(4) Having given special consideration to these ideas I had ordered the formation of a Committee with a view to increasing the powers of the Assembly to an appreciable extent. Having regard, however, to

the present circumstances it is desirable that the representatives of the people should have their due share in framing the new constitution. It is also desirable that the representatives of the important sections of the country be associated equally to work out the proposals with due and full regard to the general conditions and trends of thought in the country, and after taking into account the present aspirations of the people to shoulder greater responsibilities. Until such time as these proposals are fomulated and a new Government based on these proposals is formed, I trust that those political parties which are not represented in the present Interim Government, will join and take proper share in shouldering the responsibilities of Government.

(5) I have had some misgivings about the state of affairs in the country which has arisen owing to outside influences. I trust that the various classes of people of the country will adopt every possible means to preserve peace and tranquillity and that they will devote themselves to removing all such tendencies in the public life of the State as are likely to endanger the peace or to affect the prestige and position of the State. In order to achieve these aims as early as possible I am directing the Prime Minister to give his special attention to the matter and, bearing in mind the arguments put forward by the various schools of thought in the State, submit proposals to me with the opinion of Government within a reasonable time. I hope that all organisations in the country will co-operate fully with the Government to achieve this aim.

"THE EFFORT IS MINE—ITS ATTAINMENT RESTS WITH THEE."

Extract from the Hindu (Madras), dated April 25, 1948, of a speech by the Prime Minister of India (Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) at the All-India Congress Committee Session in Bombay on April 24.

....Pandit Nehru said as far as he could see, by compulsion of events both geographical and economical, Hyderabad would have to accede to India. "There are two courses now open to Hyderabad—war or accession," Pandit Nehru said. "War is a prolonged affair, and if we resort to it, many new problems will arise. We have therefore been trying to solve this problem by negotiations, but that does not mean that we are afraid of following the path of war."

Pandit Nehru said that the Government of India wished to apply the same principles to Hyderabad, as in the case of Kashmir, Junagadh and other States, namely that the wish of the people of the State should ulimately prevail. With that end in view, Government had

persuaded most of the Indian States to grant Responsible Government to the people and Hyderabad was the only State where this has not been done so far.

Pandit Nehru referred to the border incidents, and said that the Central Government and the Provincial Governments of Madras and Bombay were seized of the situation. If in spite of the indications they had, the Nizam's Government continued to connive at the exploits of the Razakars, their connivance was liable to be regarded by the Indian Government as a hostile act. The fact that the Central Government and the Provincial Governments were not vocal about the border incidents must not be construed as impassivity. As a Government, thay had to be careful about what they said. Any suggestions from the members of the A.I.C.C. would be most welcome, but, despite the urgent nature of the problem, it would be wrong to advise Government to " draw the sword and march," concluded Pandit Nehru.

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Extract from The Hindu (Madras), dated April 27, 1948, of Pandit Nehru's speech in Bombay on April 26, 1948.

The Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, declared here to-day "The Government of India's patience in dealing with the issue of Hyderabad State is on the verge of being exhausted."

Pandit Nehru was answering a question at a reception given by the Bombay Union of Journalists whether the Government of India would intervene in Hyderabad State if the safety of the people in the State were endangered by the activities of the Razakars.

Pandit Nehru said it was not a question of accession, nor even of Responsible Government in the State, although these issues were important by themselves. "The real question is this," Pandit Nehru said "that a certain section of people in Hyderabad is committing hostile acts against the Government of India. We do not know if that section of people represents the Hyderabad Government. We do not know if the Hyderabad Government are powerless to check it, or may be, they do not desire to check it."

"In either event, the time has arrived when this hostility must cease. If the Hyderabad Government cannot stop it other measures will be adopted to stop it."

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Speech by the Prime Minister of Hyderabad to the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly on April 27, 1948.

It is little over a year ago that Sir Mirza Ismail, then Prime Minister, had addressed you on the occasion of the opening of the new Legislative Assembly and I am addressing you now in the same capacity. You are well aware of the great events and changes which have since taken place both within and outside our State. Inevitably the internal and external affairs of Hyderabad have been affected by these events, but it is a matter of thankfulness that, in spite of the many tempests that we have had to face, we have stood firm and have held on resolutely to our own traditions of which we have always been proud; and, God willing we shall continue to hold on to them to be handed over to the generations that will come after us.

The withdrawal of the British left the erstwhile British India divided into the Dominions of India and Pakistan. The Indian States, under the new plan, were left free to chose between accession to either Dominion or to remain independent if they so wished. This division, as we all know, was made on a communal basis and it cannot now be denied that, despite all attempts, it has left one or the other minority community in an unhappy position in the respective Dominion. Our August Sovereign, in accordance with the noble traditions of his dynasty, decided against becoming part of either Dominion so as not to hurt the feelings of either of the two principal communities living in this States. Nevertheless, situated as Hyderabad is, it is obvious that we should have close and intimate links with the Indian Union. Hyderabad is fully cognisant of the fact that both geographically and politically it has to be in close association with the Indian Union. It is also realised that Hyderabad in matters of defence, external affairs and communications has to have a close understanding with the surrounding country. We are also not unaware of the fact that our communications with the rest of the world are only possible through the territory of the Indian Union.

In regard to defence we believe that if the position of India is made insecure by any external aggression our position cannot remain unaffected no matter how much we may choose to maintain a separate indentity.

In these days foreign policy is an inseparable part of defence and common strategy and it, therefore, follows that in view of the obvious limitations in regard to our defence, we cannot formulate any separate policy in external affairs.

Our system of communications, in like manner, being linked in all

directions with that of the Indian Union, must therefore, be co-ordinated closely with All-India communications.

These are the fundamentals which no one can ignore. With the full realisation therefore of these facts, we have tried all along to build up a relationship with the Indian Union which would take full account of the factors enumerated above and yet keep intact the sovereignty of the Nizam and adequately preserve our economic independence, our ancient traditions, culture and heritage. This being the nature of our sentiments and in view of our desire to remove all suspicion and establish an atmosphere of friendliness, it is difficult to understand why we are not able to come to a friendly arrangement with the Indian Union even though our approach has always been so relistic. In a spirit of good-will and for mutual benefit it should have been possible to conclude an agreement honourable and advantageous to both sides. Hyderabad could, and can yet, be an asset to the Indian Union ; a willing ally, a progressive neighbour and a real friend at all times. It was in consideration of these that a Standstill Agreement was concluded towards the end of November last for one year. It is however a pity that while on the one hand we were always required to observe all the terms of the Agreement and which we did to the best of our ability, the Indian Union remained indifferent to the fulfilment of their obligations. Your are generally aware of the details. We were never supplied with arms and ammunition, our goods have been stopped at ports and restrictions have been placed on our exports. Complaints and counter-complaints have resulted only in building up voluminous files. In short there has been a barrier between the Indian Union and ourselves; that barrier has been that of suspicion. It is immaterial whether that suspicion is well-founded or ill-founded. The fact remains that there are strong suspicions which are dividing us and, owing to this suspicion, Hyderabad's actions, motives and objectives are unfortunately viewed is a wrong light. Hyderabad is at times referred to as an " unfriendly foreign territory." She is alleged to have aggressive designs against the Indian Union, is charged with plans of annexations of Union territory and is painted as a land of misery and communal strife. Over the radio public speeches of officials and non-officials are all directed against Hyderabad in a manner that seems to make a conflict inevitable. I cannot deny the fact that there have, on various occasions, been outbursts of a similar character from private individuals from this side as well. But can we not pause and ask ourselves: " What is it all for."

The Indian Union appears to feel that Hyderabad must accede to it and that if accession does not come about, there would be trouble. They do not like to think of Hyderabad in any other terms. If Hyderabad persists in thinking on different lines she is to be forced to accept

the lines on which the Indian Union wishes her to think. Have we not a right to ask why we should be forced to think only in terms specified by the Union if we can offer them our good-will, friendship, and co-operation in a different manner? And why, if we ask this simple question, should it be regarded as an unfriendly act? After all, what has the Indian Union, with all its might, resources and its great future to worry about if Hyderabad prefers to maintain an honourable position for itself?

From about July 1947 onwards Hyderabad has been experiencing an economic blockade on account of which the population is being made to suffer great hardships in securing the dire necessities of life. Her borders have been turned into hunting ground for raiders, communists or other inspired from outside. Simple incidents have been exaggerated in a manner that cannot but create hatred and ill-will against Hyderabad. The legitimate demands of the Government for the maintenance of peace and security have been denied and day after day her patience is being tried. I am afraid it is this attitude which has roused the feelings of the people; it has created mistrust aud ill-will among the communities. It is indeed a bad policy in my view to drive any set of people to desperation particularly when it is totally unnecessary. Must the Indian leaders always think in terms of using force against Hyderabad, and if so, for what purpose? Must Hyderabad always suspect the Indian Union of aggressive designs aud can that apprehension not be allayed? If we all keep on talking and thinking in bellicose terms it is sure to lead to disaster and no one knows where it will end. It is no use allowing things to go so far. Once a conflagration is started it is not easy to control.

It will be our earnest endeavour to maintain and promote peace and friendship to the last moment. But if in spite of all our efforts we are compelled and force is used against us and an unavoidable situation not of our seeking is created then there will be no course left for us other than to face it honourably with courage and determination to the best of our ability and leave the end in the hands of Providence. We may be weak and helpless but our cause is just and our faith in Almighty is unshakable.

I am one of those who believe that a happy settlement with Hyderabad in the very early stages would have had a very sobering effect upon inter-communal relations both in India and Pakistan; in fact, I believe, that its psychological reaction would have greatly minimised, if not altogether eliminated, the stark tragedy that was enacted in East and West Punjab. I still believe that the great tension throughout Southern India can be eased and we can all start on the road of mutual regard, peace and prosperity. Mahatma Gandhi, that great

sage of India told me only the day before his tragic assassination that "Shanti" was more precious than anything else and advised me to work for peace at any price. On my part I fully believe in that noble advice and shall spare no effort to follow that golden principle even though, unfortunately, some of the Mahatma's close and more ardent followers might choose to talk of aggression, force and blockade. The world is passing through a great turmoil. China, the Arab countries, Russia, Europe and most countries of the American continent are in a state of grave uncertainty. Who knows where the fire may start that would lead to mass destruction of human race. Both the people of India and Pakistan have already undergone great hardship and privation. In the face of these events any narrow-minded outlook or aggressive tendency could never be forgiven. I would like to assure the Indian Union that our efforts will be fully concentrated on maintaining law and order along the borders and we are ever ready to offer and seek co-operation. I would also like to make it clear that it is not our objective to enter into any alliance with outside powers directed against the Indian Union. I would once again appeal to the Union authorities to remove all suspicion and build up an atmosphere of mutual confidence and friendship.

I now turn to internal affairs.

Hyderabad as we have always claimed, has inherited glorious traditions which have stood the test of time. We have been, and shall always be progressive in our outlook. If we have not subscribed to certain slogans, if we have not met in full the exaggerated demands of a certain group, it would be unrealistic to brand us as undemocratic and reactionary. It is deplorable that a section of people should think fit, in misguided heat to carry out the dictates from outside regardless of the true interests of the country in which they live. That they should try to create those conditions in our own homeland which have caused untold misery and suffering in other places. That is certainly an unjustifiable step. I still hope that better sense will prevail. Our August Sovereign, who is the fountain-head of all our political and cultural ideas, has generously given a great lead in the *Firman-e-Mubarak* issued last week. As a mature statesman he has taken all facts into account and outlined a process which should satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the various groups living in this beautiful land. Let there be no hasty conclusions drawn from the wording of the *Firman-e-Mubarak* or its sense misinterpreted. Correctly understood and carefully worked, it will largely meet the demands of all elements in public life. We can, in a peaceful manner, following the lines laid down by our Ruler, arrive at the cherished goal and shoulder the heavy responsibilities of Government with harmony and good-will among all the communities. Any other course, I am

afraid, will lead to discord and bitterness. Let not the tranquillity of our homes be disturbed by external dictates and outside considerations—let it not be forgotten that we owe a duty to our Beloved Sovereign and to our Motherland.

The Government proposes to act on the lines laid by our Sovereign. Now is the time for all sections and communities living in this great land to get together and help to formulate constitution which will fit with the present day needs and fulfil the peoples' aspirations to the greatest extent possible without giving up our heritage and the noble traditions which we hold so dear. Let past differences be forgotten, let external influences be set aside and let us make the land we live in a happy and contented home for all her sons. Once again I say that the doors of Government are open to those who do not have their due share in it at present. Let them not keep away because some has asked them to keep away. I emphasise that the existing suspicions are unfounded; and the assumption of the role of a hero or a martyr appears to me to be totally unnecessary. Let me dispel the doubts of some of my friends and tell them that there is a strong and stable Government in Hyderabad, alive to all its responsibilities and responsible to the Ruler and answerable to the people and not to any particular political party or person. Because a certain political section is not represented in Government it should not be concluded that there is no Government or that it owes allegiance to any one other than the Ruler. Government is functioning with fullest responsibilities and I am glad to say maintains a degree of efficiency which is in no way less than that in the surrounding areas. No doubt a few months ago the administrative machinery of the State was greatly strained owing to extraneous influences. There were raids; there were internal differences. And while the spirit of service existed among all ranks of Government servants, close collaboration and co-ordination were to a certain extent, lacking. I am thankful to Almighty that that is not the case now. The efficiency of the services has greatly improved. There is close collaboration among them all and a great spirit of loyal service is manifest in all ranks. The strain which they faced has helped to bring out the better and nobler instincts of selfless service inherent in most of them and so to get them together. I must express my great appreciation and satisfaction and my thanks are due to every member of the service and to the public who have co-operated.

We are now therefore able to withdraw certain restrictions which the Government had perforce to impose. The situation all round being reasonably under control, I have no hesitation in releasing most of the political prisoners who have not been connected with subversive and violent activities and in withdrawing the warrants against others who, I understand, have taken up residence outside the State. I

have no hesitation also in lifting the ban on the Communist organisation. But, let me make it abundantly and unambiguously clear, that while Government does not propose to place restrictions on the various political ideologies it will permit, in no circumstances, any subversive or unlawful activities or any attempts to create discord and lawlessness. Instances of this nature will severely be dealt with. Government will zealously and firmly maintain law and order and will spare no element, regardless of caste, creed or ideo'ogy if they indulge in any lawless activities or endanger the peace and tranquillity of the country....

Lettēr, dated May 1, 1948, from His Excellency the Governor-General of India to His Exalted Highness the Nizam.

I sent Your Exalted Highness a telegram from Ootacamund acknowledging your letter of 22nd April.

As you know, I am leaving India in 6½ weeks' time. The main object which I hope to achieve before my departure is to retain peace and tranquility in South India and to do all in my power to re-establish good relations between Hyderabad and India without which these conditions cannot be maintained. I believe that Your Exalted Highness must have similar objects at heart.

It is so difficult to deal with these great issues by correspondence or through intermediates, even of the outstanding quality of our good friend, Sir Walter Monckton.

I had hoped that the opportunity for me to accept Your Exalted Highness' kind invitation to visit Hyderabad might arise. But I know that you will understand that in the very short time left to me to complete my constitutional duties and hand over to my successor, it is not practicable for me to have the pleasure of doing this.

This is a great disappointment to me, but I sincerely trust that it will not mean that you and I cannot meet before I go. I believe that if only we could do so, it will be possible for us in two or three days to clear away nearly all the misunderstandings and difficulties of the past months. I believe that by means of friendly informal conversation between the two of us alone and by an exchange of ideas for our mutual benefit and enlightenment we could find methods of achieving the objects which we both have uppermost in our minds.

I am oppressed by the fact that time is desperately short, not only because of my own departure, but also because of the rapidly deteriorat-

ing situation. So, therefore, both on personal and public grounds, I am deeply hopeful that you will do my wife and me the honour of naming a date—(and I trust that it will be in the near future)—and staying with us at Government House, New Delhi, whilst still I am His Majesty the King's representative in India. If, of course, you would prefer to occupy your place in Delhi we would quite understand, but in any case I can assure you of a most sincere welcome and of a very correct and highly cordial reception here by us and by my Government.

I can also assure you that, if you accept my invitation, I would make it my personal concern to ensure that the best possible arrangements were made for your journey by train through Indian territory, including, of course, the provision of properly air-conditioned compartments.

I understand that Your Exalted Highness gave all previous Viceroy's the pleasure of a visit by you to them in Delhi. I was sorry that this was not possible whilst I was still Crown Representative. Indeed, Your Exalted Highness has been the only one amongst all the major Rulers in the sub-continent who has not given me the pleasure of a visit.

I am convinced that there is no advantage to be gained by Your Exalted Highness simply waiting upon events in the expectation that time is on your side. Indeed, I am convinced that inaction involves the greatest danger and that the best interests of your State and dynasty will be served by the personal initiative you take now. I fully realise the great difficulties in the way of your leaving Hyderabad even for a day or two at this critical time when your hands must be so full. But I firmly believe that the wisest and indeed the safest course would be for you to overcome these difficulties and to come to Delhi.

I have heard from Sir Walter Monckton and understand that he is not keen to come out to India again unless there is a real prospect of a quick settlement between India and Hyderabad. I have written to him to tell him that I believe that, in spite of the difficulties of the present situation, such a prospect would exist if Your Exalted Highness were to accept my invitation to come to Delhi, so that you and I could deal with the matter by means of personal contact.

P.S. 5th May.—I have held this letter to take the opportunity of sending it by the safe hand of your Agent-General.

Extract from "The Hindu" (Madras), dated May 2, 1948, of a statemsnt by Pandit Nehru at a Press Conference in New Delhi on May 1.

Turning to Hyderabad, the Prime Minister reiterated that the Indian Union could not possibly tolerate any part of Indian territory, inside or on the borders, to be a potential foreign base. There could be only two alternatives to Hyderabad, just as in regard to any other State, namely, accession or of subsidiary association. In the case of accession it would be partnership in the Union and not submission to the Union, and in case of a subsidiary association such association would not get the benefits of the Union. Governments, he said, even as individuals, acted on the compulsion of events and no doubt the Hyderabad Government was not outside the sphere of compulsion of events.

Referring to his Bombay speech, in which he was reported to have stated that the alternative before Hyderabad was "war or accession," the Prime Minister attributed this statement to an incorrect translation of his Hindustani speech. In fact he had mentioned neither and explained that what he said was that Hyderabad, situated as it was, must have the closest possible relation with India or else there must be conflict. No doubt he had spoken on accession also and the Government did hold that Hyderabad must become part of the Indian Union because of various factors such as geographical, economic, military and political, which none could ignore............

There was talk of independence of Hyderabad. Independence signified independence in regard to foreign relations and defence—war. If Hyderabad could not have that right of war and defence and foreign relations, then it was not independence. The Indian Union could not possibly tolerate any part of the Indian territory inside or on its borders to be potentially capable of being made into foreign bases. No Government in India could tolerate it and India's general policy must inevitably be to prevent that happening. It would endanger her security and lead to constant and ceaseless conflict.

Hyderabad must, therefore, necessarily form part of the Indian Union. Having said that the question of accession as such, which India considered inevitable some time or other, was not the primary issue today. But certainly India had never talked in terms of forcing by military methods any State to accession. Government had talked in terms of the people deciding the issue of plebiscite or referendum and not the army deciding the will of the people. The very important issue was the issue of Responsible Government and from that other things might flow. Whatever might have been the picture of India

a year ago, today there was no part of India where there was no Responsible Government actually functioning or on the point of functioning. No State or any other part of India had got autocratic rule except Hyderabad State. It was the one and only one exception and socially speaking, it was a very backward State with its autocracy and feudal set-up. It was inconceivable to him to imagine that this kind of thing could possibly continue when the whole of India had changed. That itself would produce a conflict between Hyderabad and India surrounding it. Therefore, Responsible Government became an important and urgent issue.

Even so, the important issue was not even that, but some kind of peace and order on the borders and internally in Hyderabad. That had to be given the first priority, because one could not have Responsible Government or any Government if those troubles continued. During the last few months, these troubles had continued on borders and there had been repeated major incidents apart from minor incidents ....

Asked whether there had been an economic blockade of Hyderabad the Prime Minister referred to the Standstill Agreement which, he regretted, had not been complied with at all ever since.............. The Government of India had information that Hyderabad was trying its utmost by fair means or otherwise to get all manner of arms from foreign countries............Many were smuggled in................ Many of these were stopped by the Customs Authorities he said, and naturally certain things which ought not to have been stopped were also stopped, but later when the Government came to know of that, the authorities were directed to send them on. So, what was happening was not exactly an economic blockade. If there was an economic blockade it would be much more serious affecting articles of food and other things. What had happened in effect had been with regard to weapons or other things, which might go towards the making of weapons.

Asked whether the Government of India would relax their demand for the accession of Hyderabad, if the State was prepared to comply with the other demands, the Prime Minister pointed out that there could only be two possible ways. One was accession to the Indian Union, which meant defence, communications and external affairs being controlled by the Union in which Hyderabad also was represented. It was not submission to the Union, but a partnership in a large association of units. That was one way. The other way was in not acceding but being in some kind of subsidiary association with India. Here again, the State would have to surrender the three subjects. It could either have a partnership with the Union with a voice in its

affairs or a subsidiary association, in which it did not get the benefits of a union but had to yield the same subjects......

Telegram, dated May 6, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

I have read in the paper that Your Excellency is leaving India in June next. Under the circumstances I remind you of my invitation to visit Hyderabad which I had extended some time ago and trust that you will not disappoint me as I am anxious to make my acquaintance with you prior to your departure, since you belong to the Royai family of England. In my opinion some date can be fixed by the middle of June, for Hyderabad is ready to welcome you with its traditional hospitality and friendship.

Telegram, dated May 8, 1948, from the Governor-General of India to the Nizam.

Your telegram of sixth May (which I only received on the evening of the seventh on my return from tour) must, I think, have crossed my letter which I sent down by the safe hand of your Agent-General that day. Your Exalted Highness will by now had an opportunity of considering the suggestion contained therein.

Letter, dated May 9, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

I am grateful to Your Excellency for your letter dated 1st May (and endorsed again the 5th May) which Zain Yar Jung delivered to me on the 7th May. It appears that Your Excellency's letter and my telegram dated 6th May inviting Your Excellency to visit Hyderabad before your departure from India crossed each other.

(2) I fully share Your Kxcellency's anxiety towards the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in South India and I need hardly say how earnestly I desire an early and honourable settlement of all the outstanding issues between the Indian Union and Hyderabad. I am also conscious fully of the grave consequences that may follow if the already tense situation is allowed to deteriorate further. It is to avoid such an eventuality that I and my Government have always been

anxious to do all that is possible and our final views for an amicable settlement have already been placed before you and your Government. Indeed I have always believed that Your Excellency is in a specially privileged personal position to make valuable contribution towards the establishment of confidence and good-will on both sides. It would indeed be a matter of great disappointment to me if you were to leave India before any satisfactory understanding is arrived at between the Indian Union and Hyderabad.

(3) While I greatly appreciate the kind invitation of Your Excellency aud Lady Mountbatten for me to visit Delhi, there are, as you have very lightly observed, great difficulties in my way to leave Hyderabad and it is not possible for me, under the existing circumstances, to visit Delhi. Besides, any such move is certain to give rise to grave misunderstandings both inside and outside Hyderabad which I am bound to avoid. I am, all the same, grateful for your kind invitation to come to Delhi.

(4) Despite the severe pressure of work and very limited time at your disposal, I still hope Your Excellency and Lady Mountbatten would find it possible to pay a short visit to Hyderabad before your departure in June. I need hardly repeat how disappointed I shall feel otherwise. However, should time and pressure of work not permit you to come to Hyderabad even for a day or two, then I must content myself by wishing Your Excellency and Lady Mountbatten a glorious and prosperous furture and everything best in life.

(5) I am sending this letter through my Agent-General, Zain Yar Jung, to be delivered to you personally.

Letter, dated May 15, 1948, from the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, to the Prime Minister of Hyderabad.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 5th April, 1948, to the Hon'ble the Prime Minister of India.

2. The Government of H. E. H. the Nizam are aware that the conclusion of a Standstill Agreement for one year, without the accession of the State to the Dominion of India, is an exceptional arrangement to which the Government of India have not agreed in the case of any other State. In the case of Hyderabad, the Government of India acquiesced in such an arrangement out of consideration for the special circumstances of the State, and in the hope that during the period of the

Agreement the State would be able to settle its internal difficulties so as to make it possible for it to accede to the Dominion of India.

3. The Government of India regret to note that, while they themselves have spared no efforts to implement the Standstill Agreement in the spirit in which it was concluded, the Government of H. E. H. the Nizam have acted in violation of the Agreement almost from the moment of its conclusion. There has been much technical argument on the question whether any one of these acts is an infringement of the terms of particular provisions of the Agreement (although it is difficult to see what technicalities can justify the Hyderabad Government in, for instance, placing orders overseas for arms and ammunition except through, or without obtaining the prior consent of, the Government of India : and that in quantities far in excess of anything that the State, according to its own calculations, requires). The Government of India, however, have no doubt that all these acts go counter to the spirit and essence of the Agreement, as is clear from the fact that they have all had the intention and effect of emphasising the sovereignty of Hyderabad and its separateness from India, particularly in matters concerning External Affairs and Defence, whereas the Standstill Agreement required that the *status quo* (including the position of Hyderabad as a State in association with India and having no external status) should be maintained. And the Government of India believe that any impartial observer will agree with their view on this question.

4. The Government of H.E.H. have suggested that the points in dispute should be referred to arbitration, and it is no doubt true that the Standstill Agreement provides for such reference. But, considering the large number of points on which differences have already emerged, it is clear that arbitration on these points would take up all that remains of the period of one year for which the Agreement is to run, leaving little scope for the implementation of the award of the arbitrator. Reference to arbitration, moreover, could be regarded as a practical solution only if the Hyderabad Government were agreeable to taking certain steps immediately which could be regarded as a genuine token of that Government's desire to maintain cordial and friendly relations with the Government of India.

5. The most urgent of these steps are—

(*a*) to declare illegal and to disband the Razakars, the volunteer organisation of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen ; and

(*b*) to ensure that the press and radio controlled by the Government of Hyderabad cease forthwith from propaganda hostile to the Government of India.

6. The Government of India find it difficult to reconcile the

assurances of friendliness and good-will towards India of H. E. H.'s Government, contained in your letter, with the attitude of your Government towards the Razakar organisation. It is suggested in your letter that the Razakars (who have been responsible for many acts of violence not only in the State of Hyderabad itself, but also in the territories of the Dominion of India) have a recognised part to play in the internal security arrangements of the State, which indicates that they function with the support and sympathy of H. E. H.'s Government. The information in the possession of the Government of India, however, shows that the activities of the Razakars are in fact directed towards the following purposes :—

(*a*) suppressing all opposition in the State by violent methods ;

(*b*) terrorising the border areas of the three neighbouring Indian Provinces by irresponsible acts of violence ;

(*c*) conducting a virulent propaganda against India ; and

(*d*) organising and mobilising Muslims in some parts of India against the Government of India.

The Government of India cannot but take extremely grave notice of such activities especially when they take place in its own territories ; and the close association between H. E. H.'s Government and the Razakars becomes therefore a matter seriously affecting the relations between the two Governments.

7. The Government of India also observe that while frequent complaints have been made by your Government of Communist incursions upon Hyderabad State territory, it is reported that Government have recently removed the ban, which they had earlier imposed, upon the Communist party.

8. The Government of India cannot regard it as friendly behaviour towards India for the Government of Hyderabad to allow broadcasts over the Hyderabad radio and articles in the press whose tone and contents are consistently hostile to India and designed to confirm the people of Hyderabad State and India in their apprehension that the Government of Hyderabad are not desirous of continued friendly relations with the Government of India.

9. The Government of India have shown great forbearance in the face of such openly provocative actions in the hope that the hostility and violence would be a passing phase and that friendliness and cordial relations, the desirability of which the Hyderabad Government have invariably accepted, would soon take thefr place. It would appear, however, that this attitude has been taken as a sign of weakness. Nothing could be more unfortunate.

10. The Government of India further regret to note that H.E.H.'s Government have throughout the last five months adopted an attitude not conducive to a lasting solution of the Indo-Hyderabad problem. While failing to implement the Standstill Agreement, your Government have unequivocally declined so much as to discuss the question of accession; and, in spite of assurances, they have also declined to announce the grant of responsible Government in the State, to summon a Constituent Assembly, or even to reconstruct the present Government —thus shutting out all sections of the people of Hyderabad from a voice in its government, except the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, which represents only a scetion of the 14 per cent. Muslim population of the State. On the other hand, your Government is in active association with the Ittehad, and the Razakar organization is being strengthened with the direct assistance of your Government.

11. While maintaining the closest relations with Pakistan, your Government have embarked on activities which endanger not only the tranquillity of South India, but threaten communal relations throughout India.

12. I am to say that the Government of India, after giving the whole matter their most careful consideration, have come to the conclusion that if conditions are to improve rapidly—and rapid improvement has now become absolutely essential—it is imperative that H.E.H. the Nizam's Government should take immediate steps to put an end to the activities of the Rizakars. The Government of India are convinced that this is the only way in which peace and normal conditions can be re-established in Hyderabad and its neighbourhood, and cordial relations restored beween the Government of India and Hyderabad. They hope that on an objective consideration of the situation, H.E.H. the Nizam will agree with this view.

13. H.E.H. the Nizam will also appreciate that the Government of India have responsibility to their own citizens and must therefore take effective action for safeguardiug the security and essential interest both of India and of her people.

Telegram, dated May 18, 1948, from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States.

One hundred and forty wagons of salt booked to Hyderabad have been stopped by Railway authorities at Manmad under orders of Bombay Police. Apart from the fact that this is an infringement of

Standstill Agreement salt is a commodity most essential for maintenance of life of community. Kindly take necessary action to remove restrictions and let me have a telgraphic reply.

Note, dated May 19, 1948, from the Chief Commercial Manager and Chief Transportation Superintendent, Nizam's State Railway, to the General Manager, Nizam's State Railway.

On 8-5-1948 a telegram was received from the Government Railway Police at Manmad as under:—

"From Rly. Police MMR To SM MMR.D/8-5-48.

Pl. arrange to put a stop all wagons going to Nizam's State containing salt as it is prohibited. Detain the wagons urgently from today. Wagon No. 1908 should also be detained.

17 M G wagons of this railway which had been loaded with salt detained under these orders from 8-5-1948 and after repeated representations made to the CTS and CTM, GIP and to the GM., GIP by our GM that we were exteremely short of MG wagons for urgent priority traffic the 17 MG wagons were again unloaded at Manmad and worked away empty on the 15th instant. Since then further arrivals of BG salt wagons are being held up awaiting further orders and today the 19th instant, 140 BG salt wagons are standing under load awaiting disposal.

On 11-5-1948 the following telegram was received from the CTS, GIP Railway:—

From BB D/-10/5 All Rys Tfc.

M. 22/227 x With I/E and until further advicc stop bkg of ali goods tfc from your rly to Metre Gauge stns reached via MMR aaa Rcp BB agrees CTS."

On the 15th instant the following notification appeared in the *Times of India:*—

TRANSPORT OF WEAPONS RESTRICTED.

Madras, May 14.

The Governmeut of Madras have issued orders declaring the following articles as "essential articles" under the purview of the Madras Essential Articles (Control and Requisitioning) Order:

Dangerons weapons, which when used as weapons of offence, are likely to cause death ; articles capable of being used for commiting arson or causing destruction of buildings, bridges or other properties ; machinery capable of being used for or in the manufacture of weapons or articles specified above; petroleum and petroleum products, bicycles, motor launches, medicine and medical equipment.

An order has been promulgated prohibitiug the movement of "esential articles" in the district of Kistna, East Godawri, West, Godawri, Guntur, Kurnool and Bellary—with effect from today."

I, spoke to the ATS Bezwada today as the DTS Bezwada was out on line enquiring whether the above restriction is likely to affect movement of these commodities to this railway and he informs me that the commodities will not move into the State as their movement across the bordering districts referred to is also prohibited.

I then spoke to the Chief Optg. Supdt. & Chief Comml. Manager, M.S.M. Rly. and they inform me that so far no restriction has been imposed on traffic to the N.S. Railway by the M.S. Ry. but the restriction imposed by the Madras Government will result in a stoppage of movement of commodities referred to to this railway.

I may add that so far there has been a slight falling off in the volume of traffic from via Bezwada, but the through traffic in transit is moving without any apparent restriction.

Letter, dated May, 20, 1948, from the Additional Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Agent-General for India, Hyderabad.

It has been reported to the Nizam's Government that 140 wagons of salt booked to Hyderabad have been stopped by the Railway authorities at Manmad under the orders of the Bombay Police. The Nizam's Government consider this to be serious infringement of the terms of the Standstill Agreement. I shall be grateful if you will kindly make the necessary enquiries and let me know the reason for the detention of these wagons. In the meantime, the Government of Bombay may kindly be asked to rescind its orders and release these wagons forthwith. It will be appreciated that salt is a commodity most essential for the maintenance of the life of the community.

Letter, dated May 22, 1948, from the Secretary to Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Agent-General for India, Hyderabad.

Please refer to my letter No. 4729/EA dated 20th May, 1948, in regard to the stoppage of salt booked to Hyderabad. The Nizam's Government have now received further details of this matter from which it appears that 17 meter guage wagons of the N.S. Railway which had been loaded with salt were first detained at Manmad and when repeated representations were made to the Chief Transportation Superintendent, The Chief Traffic Manager and the General Manager, G.I.P. Railway, stating that we were extremely short of meter guage wagons for priority traffic, the 17 wagons were unloaded and returned empty on the 15th instant. One hundred and thirty broad gauge loads of salt booked to stations on our railway via Manmad have also been held up under orders of the Bombay Police. The Nizam's Government take a very serious view of the action taken by the Bombay Police and I shall be grateful if you will kindly move the Government of Bombay to rescind its orders and let me know the reason for such action having been taken by them.

In addition to what I have mentioned above we have also received information that the booking of the following essential commodities from any station in the Madras Province to any Station in Hyderabad State unless authorised by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies has been restricted :—

1. Jaggery.
2. Sugar and its products.
3. G.N. Oil.
4. Gingili seed and its oil
5. Copra and its oil.
6. Cattle.
7. Sheep and goats.
8. Meat and fish.
9. Tamarind and coriander seed.
10. Garlic.
11. Kumma.
12. Chillies.
13. Lak dhall.
14. Kesari dhall and its products.
15. Burma beans.

The Madras Government have also imposed a ban on the movement of certain essential commodities including petroleum and petrol products, bicycles, medicines and medical equipment, into the districts

of Krishna, East Godavari, West Godavari, Guntur, Kurnool and Bellary. There restrictions are bound to result in the stoppage of movement of these commodities to the Nizam's State Railway. There has already been a slight falling off in the volume of traffic via Bezwada.

You will, no doubt, realise that most of these commodities are essential for the life of the people and the action of the Madras Government in imposing these restrictions is bound to have very serious repercussions. I am, therefore, to request you kindly to address them with the utmost urgency in order to ensure that the ban is withdrawn immediately.

———

Letter, dated May 23, 1948, from the Prime Minister of Hyderabad to the Prime Minister of India.

Please refer to the letter, dated 15th May, 1948, addressed to me by the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States, forwarded through the Nizam's Agent-General in Delhi and received by me on 18th May, in reply to my letter of the 5th April, 1948, regarding relations between the Gevernment of India and the Nizam's Government.

While the Government of India entered into a Standstill Agreement for one year in the hope that Hyderabad might see its way to accede before the period of the Agreement expired, I must emphasize that, so far as Hyderabad is concerned. the Agreement was concluded in the earnest hope that it would work satisfactorily and prepare the ground tor a friendly and more permanent relationship, short of accession, between India and Hyderabad.

It is said in paragraph 3 of the letter that, while the Government of India have spared no efforts to implement the Standstill Agreement in the spirit in which it was concluded, the Nizam's Goxernment have acted in violation of the Agreement almost from the moment of its conclusion. This statement, I regret to say, is not supported by facts. In paragraph 4 of my letter dated 5th April, 1948, I had said that the Nizam's Government had faithfully performed their obligations under the Agreement as they understood them : "There are ....difference of opinion as to the nature and extent of the obligations of Hyderabad under the Agreement. But the Nizam's Government is ready and willing, if it is found to have erred in its interpretation of those obligations, to carry them out as ascertained in the manner prescribed in the Agreement itself." The Nizam's Government are still genuinely anxious to remove the sources of disagreement and suspicion. They haue, in fact, taken steps which the Governor-

General of India himself recommended in regard to the most important cases in connection with which differences had arisen, *i.e.*, the so-called loan to Pakistan, and they have modified the Currency Ordinance in strict accordance with the minutes of the Conferences held on the 2nd and 4th March, 1948. The Nizam's Government regret to note that the Government of India on the other hand have not taken corresponding action even in a single item thereof. Almost from the date of India's attainment of Dominion Status Hyderabad has been subjected to economic blockade by the Indian Union authoritise. It was promised that restrictions imposed on Hyderabad's trade would be removed as soon as the Standstill Agreement had been concluded. On the contrary since the conclusion of the Agreement, the blockade has been intensified. Goods and material held up at the time of the signing of the Agreement have not been allowed to enter Hyderabad, despite repeated assurances by the Ministry of States that these consignm nts would be released. Hyderabad has been deprived of medical preparations and drugs, chemical manures, agricultural implements, handlooms and equipment for cottage industries, even chlorine for the purification of drinking water. Arms and ammunition necessary for the maintenance of internal security have not been supplied. Not only has the assistance promised in securing "soft" vehicles not been forthcoming but vehicles acquired by the Nizam's Government from other sources have been prevented from entering Hyderabad. Camps have been allowed to be established in areas bordering on Hyderabad from which raiders, armed with modern weapons, are raiding and plundering in the Nizam's Dominions. The Nizam's Government have evidence to prove that in some cases personnel of the Indian Army and Indian Police have been taking active part in such raids. In the letter under reply, the Ministry of States have not made any reference to these matters, not even those in regard to which the Nizam's Government complained that the Government of India had failed to observe their obligations and have hereby committed breaches of the Standstill Agreement.

In paragraph 3 of the letter it is also stated that Hyderabad has infringed the terms of the Standstill Agreement by placing orders overseas for arms and ammunition without obtaining the prior consent of the Government of India and "in quantities far in excess of anything that the State, according to its own calculations, requires." The Nizam's Govesnment, in accordance with the terms of the Nizam's Collateral letter, reserve their right to purchase arms and ammunition required by them when the Government of India have failed to fulfil their obligation to supply arms and ammunition within a reasonable period. The Nizam's Government, however, question the correctness of the allegation now made. They hope that charges has not been levelled in an attempt to justify non-fulfilment of obligations by the Government of India.

In paragraph 3 of the letter a further complaint is made that Hyderabad is emphasising its sovereingnty and separateness from India, particularly in matters concerning External Affairs and Defence, "whereas the Standstill Agreement required that the *status quo* (including the position of Hyderabad as a State in association with India and having no external status) should be maintained." In paragraph 1 of his letter dated 29th November, 1947, to the Governor-General, the Nizam made it clear that "by executing this Standstill Agreement I am in no way permanently prejudicing my rights as an independent sovereign, but I am, of course, conscious that I am in some important respects suspending the exercise of certain of those rights during the currency of the Agreement." Hyderabad has faithfully observed these limitations. Hyderabad, however, can never agree to the exercise of any paramountcy functions by the Government of India.

In paragraph 4 of the letter it is stated that, "considering the large number of points on which differences have already emerged, it is clear that arbitration on these points would take up all that remains of the period of one year for which the Agreement is to run, leaving little scope for the implementation of the award of the arbitrators. Reference to arbitration, moreover, could be regarded as a practical solution only if the Hyderabad Government were agreeable to taking certain steps immediately which could be regarded as a genuine token of the Government's desire to maintain cordial and friendly relations with the Government of India," The Nizam's Government have, from the very outset, used all their efforts and endeavours to resolve differences by negotiation and friendly interchange of views. They succeeded in bridging the gulf to a large extent at the conferences held between the Hyderabad Delegation and the Governor-General as late as 2nd and 4th March, 1948. But, while the Nizam's Government have taken all the steps agreed upon in the Conferences, it is a matter of great disappointment to them that the Government of India have not taken any steps whatsoever towards the implementation of the Agreement or of the specific promises made by the representatives of the Government of India on the 2nd and 4th March. In these circumstances it appeared to the Nizam's Government that no other way was left but to refer the points in dispute to arbitration, as specifically provided for in Clause 4 of the Agreement. There is no reason why arbitration should take undue time when the issues are clear-cut. Neither can the Nizam's Government accept the view that reference to arbitration "could be regarded as a practical solution only if the Hyderabad Government were agreeable to taking certain steps immediately which could be regarded as a genuine token of that Government's desire to maintain cordial and friendly relations with the Government of India." The provision for arbitration is clearly set out in the Stand-

still Agreement and recourse to it is sought under the terms of the Agreement itself. The Nizam's Government cannot agree that the Government of India can make that recourse conditional on Hyderabad's agreeing to any steps desired by the Government of India. Such an attitude is not in consonance with the terms of the Agreement —an Agrement which Hyderabad is desirous of honouring in full.

The assertion in paragraph 6 of the letter that the Nizam's Government are supporting the Razakars has already been denied by the Hyderabad Government as unwarranted. In the discussions held with the Governor-General in March, 1948, and in my letter of the 5th April, 1948, I had indicated that the question of the Razakars could not be considered in isolation and that a policy in regard to them could only be carried out as part of a concerted scheme for dealing with the situation as a whole. I had also said that, if the Hyderabad Army and Police were adequately armed and equipped to enable them to cope with raiders and local subversive elements and if Provincial Governments co-operated with Hyderabad, the *raison d'etre* of the Razakar would disappear. Insecurity in the border areas began soon after the 15th August, 1947. While the integrity of Indian Union enclaves inside Hyderabad was respected and the Hyderabad officials co-operated with officers of the Indian Union as in the past, enclaves of Hyderabad territory in Madras were cut off from Hyderabad and no co-operation was forthcoming from officials in the neighbouring Provinces. Representations failed to elicit a co-operative response from the Provinces and as recently as 30th April, 1943, the Agent-General for India in Hyderabad said that the Madras Government had refused to permit Hyderabad officials and police to pass through Madras territory to detached areas of Hyderabad territory. In the conference held with the Governor-General on the 4th March it was agreed that the Premiers of neighbouring Provinces should tour the border districts with the Prime Minister of Hyderabad. On the 25th March the States Department was requested to arrange for the proposed tours. That request remains unanswered. Meanwhile, Indian Union territory has been used as a base of operation against the State for looting, arson and murder and for illegally supplying arms and ammunition to subversive elements to carry on destructive activities in the State. There is sufficient evidence in the possession of the Nizam's Government to prove that leaders of certain political organizations in adjacent Provinces, though professing non-violence, have made common cause with the violent elements operating from Indian Union territory and conducted raids into Hyderabad. The inevitable result of these raids was a growing spirit of lawlessness, which in some areas has of late taken a communal turn. These events have led to intensification of the Razakar movement in self-defence. The Razakar organization is no more confined to one community;

it is attracting numerous followers from all other communities who have been the victims of raids.

The Nizam's Government are satisfied that the allegations made in sub-paragraph (*a*) and (*b*) of paragraph 6 are without substance. It is the first time that the allegations made in sub-paragraphs (*c*) and (*d*) have been referred to the Nizam's Government, who are unaware of any facts to substantiate the charges.

As regards paragraph 7 of the letter, Hyderabad was persistently criticised for having imposed a ban on the entire Communist movement when no such ban existed in neighbouring Provinces or most of the other parts of the Indian Union. The ban had the natural psychological effect of intensifying the feelings of Communists, and particularly of the more violent sections among them, against Hyderabad and was creating undue administrative difficulties. The object of removing the ban was to remove excessive bitterness but the Nizam's Government have made it clear that, while they do not place restrictions on political ideologies, they will in no circumstances permit subversive or unlawful activities by anyone.

Concerning paragraph 8 of the letter, ever since the conclusion of the Standstill Agreement propaganda hostile to Hyderabad has frequently been put out from India by Press and Radio and, what is more regrettable, by responsible persons in the Governments of India and the Provinces. The attention of the Government of India was drawn to this propaganda as soon as it came to the notice of the Nizam's Government, but these communications failed to elicit the desired response. It was pointed out by the Government of India that India has a free Press. It should be understood that such liberties also exist in Hyderabad. The Nizam's Government can appreciate the difficulty of the Indian Government in suppressing such propaganda, but they fail to appreciate why Indian officials and authorities, having the responsibility for maintaining good neighbourly relations, should indulge in expressions offensive and hostile to a friendly State. On the 21st March, 1948, I addressed a personal letter to you drawing your attention to the fact that All-India Radio had joined the group broadcasting false and fictitious stories against Hyderabad. After your reply on the 26th March, 1948, there was some improvement, but of late highly coloured and and exaggerated accounts against Hyderabad are being frequently broadcast again by All-India Radio and published in India newspaper. The Hyderabad Radio has had no other alternative but to contradict the false propaganda thus disseminated. With good-will on both sides, however, it should be possible to come to an arrangement whereby the Press and Radio in India and Hyderabad may be restrained from carrying on undesirable propaganda. Hyder-

abad recently entirely of its own accord gave evidence of willingness to act in this fashion. While derogatory cartoons againt the Nizam are not an infrequent feature in Indian newspapers, the Nizam's Government issued an order prohibiting the publication of cartoons which might embitter relations with India or were disrespectful to leaders of the Indian Union.

Hyderabad's earnest desire is to maintain the most cordial and friendly relations with the Government of India. The Nizam's Government deeply regret that the Government of India should feel that Hyderabad has construed any action by the Government of India "as a sign of weakness." Nothing could be further from the truth. The Nizam's Government believe that the Governmnt of India are actuated by the same motives as influence the Hyderabad Government—a desire for the cementing of a friendly and permanent relationship.

The views of the Nizam's Government on matters raised in paragraph 10 of the letter have been communicated to you on various occasions. There is nothing to be added to those views, which were formed after taking into consideration the essential interests of Hyderabad.

It is difficult to understand what is intended to be conveyed by paragraph 11 of the letter, especially the statement that the Hyderabad Government are "maintaining the closest relations with Pakistan." There appears to be no reason why Hyderabad should not maintain a cordial attitude towards Pakistan.

The questions of responsible government, the summoning of a constituent assembly and the reconstitution of the Hyderabad Government, raised in the letter, are primarily internal matters and are normally regarded as being outside the purview of Indo-Hyderabad relationship. These matters, however, have been discussed unofficially with the authorities of the Indian Union and, as indicated during those discussions the Government of Hyderabad are taking the requisite steps. A rapid move forward, unfortunately, has been made more difficult because of interference from beyond Hyderabad's borders and outside influences brought to bear on some Hyderabad political organizations. Had it not been for these external influences, much greater political advance would already have been made. It is sincerely hoped that the various political groups in Hyderabad will now be left to themselves to find a satisfactory solution of indigenous political problems.

I shall now sum up my principal points :

(1) Hyderabad earnestly desires to maintain the most friendly and cordial relations with the Indian Union.

(2) Hyderabad has been anxious to settle points of difference by friendly negotiation but, failing that, Hyderabad must demand arbitration as provided for in the Standstill Agreement.

(3) The problem of the Razakars cannot be considered in isolation but can be dealt with satisfactorily as a part of a general security settlement. Hyderabad is prepared to co-operate to the full with neighbouring Provinces in restoring order in the border districts.

(4) Hyderabad is prepared to enter into a reciprocal arrangement with India for the restraining of propaganda against either Government through Press, Radio and other media of publicity.

In conclusion, I feel sure that I am at one with you in believing that it would be extremely unfortunate for all concerned if feelings over Indo-Hyderabad relationship are allowed to continue running high. There is no justification for the harbouring of suspicions now current. Steps such as the intensification of the economic blockade and the cutting off of the supply of essentials to life, such as those mentioned above and now, according to latest reports, common salt, cannot help to bring about the mutual understanding which is so vitally necessary. Hyderabad is aware of the power and resources of the Indian Union and I would emphasise again, has no reason whatsoever to regard any of India's actions " as a sign of weakness." Given the apportunity, Hyderabad is anxious to become India's faithful friend, useful ally and helpful neighbour. Why then should India regard Hyderabad with suspicion and try to make her very existence difficult ? The Indian Union came into existence with noble aspirations and high ideals. It would not be in keeping with those lofty aims for India to pursue the present policy against Hyderabad and to reject her proffered hand of friendship which Hyderabad offers in all sincerity.

Telegram, dated May 23, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

My Prime Minister has left this morning for Delhi to see Your Excellency and Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, in connection with Hyderabad affairs and I do hope that some satisfactory settlement will be arrived at between the two Governments while Your Excellency is in India thus making it possible for you to pay a flying visit to Hyderabad prior to your departure in the third week of June. Trust Your Excellency will be good enough to help Hyderabad, since you belong to the Royal family of England, so naturally I am in need of your valuable support.

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Letter, dated May 23, 1948, from the Secretary to the Government of India, State Ministry, to the Prime Minister of Hyderabad.

I am directed to say that certain incidents which have recently happened in Hyderabad have caused the gravest concern to the Government of India.

2. It has been reported to us by our Railway authorities that at Raichur three soldiers belonging to the Indian Army who were escorting certain military stores were arrested by the Nizam's Police and consequently the wagons which were going from Avadi to Poona had to be sent back to Guntakal. The arrested soldiers have not yet been released.

3. It has further been reported to us that on the evening of May, 22, the 10-Up Mail from Madras to Bombay was attacked at Gangapur Station. The attack, which was clearly premeditated, was made by a large party of men, armed with daggers, hockey sticks and lathis. The train was attacked from both sides and the casualties are reported to be 2 killed, 11 seriously injured and 13 missing which included at least 4 women and 2 children. Though a police officer armed with a gun was on the plateform he did nothing to prevent the attack. A British field officer serving with the Indian Army was in the train at the time and he has informed us that when the mob attacked the train armed Razakars stood by on the platform.

4. The Government of India cannot tolerate a situation in which the safety of the main lines of communication in India is placed in jeopardy. They take the gravest view of the fact that their own stores and personnel engaged in the performance of legitimate duties are interfered with and subjected to harassment. They consider.

it their duty to take all necessary action to safeguard traffic on main lines of communication and to protect the life and safety of their own citizens travelling along these linese. The Government of India must therefore ask that H.E.H. the Nizam's Government should tender an expression of regret for what has happened in the State in connection with the two incidents mentioned above. They must further insist that H.E.H. the Nizam's Government must furnish effective guarantees that similar incidents will not take place (*i*) by bringing the culprits immediately to trial and punishment. and (*ii*) by taking nccessary steps to prevent further incidents of this nature.

5. Meanwhile the Government of India feel bound to make it clear that they themselves will take such steps to safeguard their interests as they may consider necessary.

Letter, dated May 24, 1648, from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States.

Please refer to your letter of the 23rd Moy, 1948, addressed to the Prime Minister of Hyderabad on the subject of the reported arrests of the three soldiers of the Indian Army at Raichur and the alleged attack on the 10-UP Mail on the 22nd May, 1948, which has been noted with regret.

2. While the Nizam's Government have ordered an immediate enquiry into the matter, I am directed to say that instructions have already been issued to provide a Hyderabad Military escort for the Grand Trunk Express and as arranged in discussion with you the Hyderabad Army will also take over very shortly the escorting of trains on the Bombay-Madras line within our territory. The exact date of taking over these duties by our Army will be communicated to you by telegram and I shall in the meanwhile be grateful if you would kindly advise your Military authorities to hand over a d take over the trains from our Units at the border until such date as our Military authorities have been instructed to allow your escort to pass through our territory with the trains on the Bombay-Madras line as personally requested by General Bucher and you.

3. I am to add that the protection and safety of the passengers travelling on these lines is essentially a concern of the Nizam's Government and they will doubtless take all necessary steps in this regard

4. A further communication will follow on receipt of the report of the enquiry that has now been ordered.

Telegram, dated May 24, 1948, from the Governor-General of India to the Nizam.

I thank Your Exalted Highness for your telegram of the 23rd May which I have received in Simla. I shall be visiting His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala on the 24th May and returning to Delhi on the 25th May after which I shall look forward to meeting your Prime Minister. I should like to take this opportunity of thanking Your Exalted Highness for the kind reception you gave Mr. Campbell-Johnson. A critical situation has now been reached and it muss be resolved in a statesmanlike way. I assure Your Exalted Highness that you can rely on my good offices at all times.

Letter, dated May 24, 1948, from the Secretary to the Agent-General for India, Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department.

I am desired to refer to Mr. Nizamuddin Hasan's D.O. letter No. 4729|EA, dated the 20th May,1948, regarding the alleged stopping, at Manmad, of 140 wagons of salt booked for Hyderabad, and to say that the matter has been referred to the authorities concerned and a communication will follow shortly.

Letter, datad May 25. 1948, from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Ministrs of States, to the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department.

Repoited stoppage of salt wagons bound for Hyderabad.

I am directed to refer to your telegram dated the 18th May, 1948, on the above subject, and to say that inquiries are being made from the Bombay Government.

Letter, dated May 30, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

Laik All tells me that Your Excellency has indicated the possibility of a short visit to Hyderabad of Your Excellencies before your departure from India more or less on a good-will mission in the month of June. I shall greatly appreciate if this is made possible and I extend

to Your Excellencies my cordial welcome. I would like to assure you that Hyderabad would offer its traditional hospitality to you both as Governor-General of India and the representative of His Majesty the King as well as a member of the Royal family of England.

(2) I trust you will let me know in due of course the probable date of Your Excellencies' visit—a date that may suit my coovenience also.

Letter, dated May 30, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

Laik Ali on his return from Delhi has presented the two alternatives which he discussed with Your Excellency and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. He has also impressed upon the necessity of extreme urgency in the matter.

(2) As Your Excellency is aware, it is a momentous decision for me and my Government to take. I have already sent a cable to Sir Walter Monckton to come over immediately and I have today received a reply that he will be arriving here on 3rd June. By that time my Government also, I expect, would be able to present their final recommendation to me. I therefore hope to be able to send you my reply immediately on Sir Walter Monckton's arrival.

(3) I hope Your Excellency will appreciate the reason of a little delay in my reply on such an important and decisive issue,

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Letter, dated May 31, 1948, from the Governor-General of India to the Nizam.

I have received your three letters of 30th May, but at this stage am only replying to the one which was not marked either 'personal' or 'personal and secret.' I can only express my regret and concern at the further delay which has been occasioned; I will not conceal the anxiety which this is causing me. As I told your Prime Minister and as he must have conveyed to you, it was my hope that he would return to Delhi on 29th May. I trust that when he does come—which will, I hope, be on the morning of 4th June at the very latest—he will be fully empowered by Your Exalted Highness to reach a final settlement.

Letter, dated June 2, 1948, from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Agent-General for India, Hyderabad.

The Nizam's Government view with grave concern the frequent attacks in the India Union, particularly in the Sholapur District of Bombay, on Hyderabad subject the Muslims generally travelling to and from Hyderabad by train. As repeated representations to the Bombay authorities have failed to be effective, I am directed to convey to the Government of India the Hyderabad Government's strong protest at these unprovoked and wanton assaults and to request that immediate steps be taken to end such lawlessness.

As must be apparent to the Government of India, these outrages have a very unsettling effect on the Hyderabad side of the border, In fact, the Ghangapur incident, which was made the occasion for so much condemnation in India and for the suspension of through passenger train services through Hyderabad, was the direct result of the provocation given by attacks on Hyderabad subjects just across the border in India. While the Nizam's Government axpressed regret for the injuries caused to a few passengers in the relatively minor incident at Ghangapur, no action appears to have been taken by the Bombay authorities to stop the assaults on train travellers in that Province. Since May 22, the date of the Ghangapur incident, at least one more serious attack on Muslims has occured on that section of the railway between Sholapur and the Hyderabad border.

Instances of the harassment of Muslim passengers travelling to Hyderabad are not confined to Bombay. On May 19, 40 Muslims on their way to Hyderabad were facibly ejected from the Grand Trunk Express at Balharshah (Central Provinces) by Indian Union troops. Similar reports of harassment have been received from Bezwada and other stations on the Madras and Southern Mahratta Railway.

It is on that section of the G.I.P. Railway between Sholapur and the Hyderabad border, however, that incidents have been most frequent and most serious. Assaults, sometimes fatal, have been occurring on that section, and specially at Dhudni, the first station on the Bombay side of the Indo-Hyderabad border, since the begnning of the year. Several of them were brought to the notice of the District Superintendent of Police in Sholapur, the Inspector-General of Police in Poona and the District Magistate of Sholapur. Despite that, the incidents continued unchecked. From the beginning of this year until May 23 the following attacks, causing death and injury to Hyderabad subjects and loss of their property, occurred ;

(1) On January 22, 0148, Rasul Saheb, a Post courier of the Nimbala Post Office, Gulburga District, was waylaid at Dudhni

railway station and severly belaboured by armed Congressites who stole his post bag. Rasul Saheb was taken to the Sholapur hospital by railway Police and died there on January 26, This attack was brought to the notice of the District Superintendent of Police, Sholapur, by the District Superintendent of Police, Gulburga, through the letter No. 94/48 dated January 30 copies of which were sent to the Inspector-General of Police in Poona and the District Magistrase, Sholapur.

(2) On January 28, two Muslims of Bardal and Arjani, who had taken *jowar* to the flour-mill at Dudhni, were breaten by Congressmen there and robbed of their *jowar*. This incident was reported to the District Superintendent of Police, Sholapur, by the District Superintendent of Police, Gulburga, by a letter dated February 12. Again copies of the letter were sent to the Inspector-General of Police in Poona and the District Magistrate of Sholapur.

(3) On February 17, Trimbak Rao, a Customs *Nakedar* of Ghangapur was seized by Congressmen at the Dhudni Railway Station and handed over to the Indian Police.

(4) On February 22, Abdul Nabi, of Ghangapur, was dragged out of train at a Dudhni, brutally assaulted and robbed of Rs. 60.

(5) On April 9, Abdul Karim, a Police constable of Police Station Jeevargi, was seized at the Dhudni Railway Station, severely beaten and handed over to the Indian Police. The matter was reported to the District Superintendent of Police, Sholapur, bp the District Superintendent of Police, Gulbarga, through his letter No. 94/57 of April 18. As far is known, Abdul Karim is still in the custody of the Indian Police.

(6) On April 23, Maula of Yelsangi was travelling to Sholapur when he was taken out of the train at Dudhni and robbed of Rs. 400. He was confined in a locked room but managed to escape.

(7) On May 15, Mahbub Ali, a Pesh Imam of Gulburga District, on his way to Ajmer was dragged out of a train at Dudhni and subjected to many indignities and brutalities, He was kept captive at Dudhni for three days before being released.

(8) On May 16, Sheikh Dawood and another Muslim were made to alight from a train at Dudhni, severely assaulted and robbed of Rs. 300.

(9) On May 18, two Muslim passengers were dragged out of a

train at Dudhni. One was murdered on the spot and the other seriously injured, being later admitted to the Railway hospital at Sholapur. According to reliable information receieved by the Nizam's Government, this outrage took place in the presence of Railway Police, who made no attempt to intervene. As soon as news of the attack was received by Taluqdar of Gulburga, he wrote to the District Magistrate of Sholapur on May 21 (Letter No. 10/1/P) drawing attention to the gravity of the situation and requesting him to take strong measures to put down lawlessness.

(10) On May 20, Ghulam Nabi of Shahabad Cement Factory, Hayat Ali and Mohd. Khwaja of Kodangal and other Muslim passengers from Hyderabad were dragged out of a train by armed men at Dudhni. Five of them were taken out of the town, stood in a row and shot. Three of them are reported to have died on the spot. The two others, Abdul Nabi and Hayat Ali, although seriously wounded, managed to reach Arjani village, in Gulbarge District, and were taken from there to the Gulbarga hospital. This outrage was brought to the notice cf the District Superintendent of Police, Sholapur, by the District Superintendent of Police, Gulbarga, by letter No 94/57F dated May 22.

(11) On May 20, the dead body of a Muslim, bearing gun-shot wounds was found lying on a track between Nimbala and Dudhni it was reported that he also was a passenger taken out of a train at Dudhni and killed. This incident was reported to the District Superintendent of Police, Sholapur, by the District Suprintendent of Police, Gulbarga, in the letter No. 94/57F dated May 22 mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

(12) On May 21, four Muslim women, some children and a boy were removed from a train at Dudhni. Their fate is unknown. At the request of Muslims at Kulali, the last railway station on the Hyderabad side of the border, all these passengers had changed from the morning passenger train to the Bombay Express which normally does not stop at Dudhni. On this day, however, the Bombay Express was halted at Dudhni.

(13) On May 23, Sheikh Mohamed Khwaja, proprietor of a hotel in Gulburga, and five other Muslims were assaulted at Kadapgaon in the presence of the station staff. About 25 men entered the compartment, injured two of the Muslims with knives, pulled all six out of the train and looted their luggage. Mohamed Khwaja and a second man managed to escape from their captors and reached Kulali in the Gulbarga District. The fate of the others is not known

Because of these repeated brutalities great indignation was caused in Gulbarga and adjoining areas of Hyderabad. The Hyderabad Government consequently took added precautions to ensure that this public feeling would not lead to untoward incidents. Police arrangements at the Gulbarga railway station were strengthened and the sub-inspector of Railway Police at Wadi was directed to remain at Gulbarga with a strong police force.

Unfortunately, on May 22, about seven or eight goondas entrained at Gulbarga in the 10 Up Mail and, on that train's arrival at Gangapur, began smashing glass shutters and assaulting some passengers. Indian reports that passengers were killed and abducted in the fracas are incorrect. No one was killed and no one adducted. As far as can be ascertained, not more than seven passengers were injured, none of them severely. Forty-eight passengers, who had left the train and hidden in adjoining fields, were given assistance by the Hyderabad Police and sent to Sholapur by special train on May 23. Four arrests in connection with the attack on passengers have been made.

The Nizam's Government have investigated the allegation that armed Hyderabad policemen were present on the Ghangapur platform and did not intervene and have found it baseless. The only policemen present were two unarmed constable—one returning by the train from Gulbrga and the other a travelling guard constable. One of these constables did intervene and was assaulted by the goondas.

While the Nizam's Government have made every endeavour to guarantee the safety of train travellers, they regret that similar measures have obviously not been taken by the Bombay Government. Hyderabad State Congress agitators and goonda elements have been allowed to continue unchecked their criminal activities at Dudhni and elsewhere on the same section of the G.I.P. Railway.

In view of the facts set out above, the Nizam's Government feel sure that the Government of India will appreciate the serious menace to the peace and tranquillity of the border areas occasioned by the outrages against train travellers in the Indian Union and feel confident that they will take the necessary measures to bring the situation under control.

Letter, dated June 3, 1948, from the Secretary to the Agent-General for India, Hyderabad, to the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department.

Complaint by H.E.H. the Nlzam's Government against the Bombay Government for stopage at Manmad of 140 *wagons of salt booked for Hyderabad.*

I am desired to refer to paragraph 1 of your letter No. 4783-E.A. dated the 22nd May, 1948, on the above subject, and to say that enquiries made from the Bombay Government reveal that 140 wagons of salt booked to Hyderabad were detained at Manmad owing to the change in gauge and the consequent difficulties in unloading and loading wagons.* The Bombay Government have not stopped the movement of salt.

2. As regards ppragraphs 2 and 3 of your letter under reference concerning ban on movement of goods from Madras, I am to add that the Government of Madras have been addressed and that a further communication will follow in due course.

Extracts from "The Hindu" (Madras) dated, June 3, 1948, of a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of India (Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) at Ootacmund on June 2.

Referring to Hyderabad in a speech here Pandit Nehru said, "We have made it perfectly clear to Hyderabad that there will have to be a solution, that ultimately there must be accession. There is no other way, and it is not possible for Hyderabad to walk out of India." Responsible Government was inevitable because in the modern world "we cannot allow a feudal Government like Hyderabad."...........

Reviewing the happenings in the country since August 15, Pandit Nehru and that they had gone through terrible messacres in the North. He took the fullest responsibility for those happenings because, he said, those misdeeds were committed by their own brethren and not by their opponents. He counselled them to follow Mahatma Gandhi's teaching and never give way to hysterical fears........

[*FOOTNOTE —Transhipment from broad gauge to metre gauge wagons is a regular procedure and, therefore, provides no excuse for the detention of the salt. In fact the consignments were not released and only one or two wagons of salt daily have been allowed to Hyderabad. There was no question of shortage of wagons; Nizam's State Railway supplied wagons, most of which were returned empty. In some instances metre gauge wagons which had been loaded with salt were actually unloaded and the empty wagons sent back to Hyderabad]

Continuing Pandit Nehru said that they had many troubles and the State of Hyderabad was "becoming a nuisance of late." There was conflict going on in Kashmir also and there were also arguments and debates about linguistic provinces. He traced the history of the Indian States system from the early days of the British rule and said it was proposed by an external agency and when that external agency went the State system also disappeard In every State in India some Responsible Government was developing except in one and that was Hyderabad. His reading of History, he said, had convinced him that it was impossible for Hyderabad to continue in that manner when the whole of India was going through revolutionary changes. "The economic and geographical situation of Hyderabad," Pandit Nehru said, "are such that it cannot remain out of India."

Pandit Nehru continued that their (India's) solution for this was to make Hyderabad accede to Indian Union in equal partnership in a common undertaking and make it an integral part of the Indian Union. For various reasons this was not accepted by Hyderabad. It was impossible for a feudal State like Hyderaqad to continue for long as such in modern India. He said some were under the impression that the Government of India was pursuing a weak-kneed policy towards Hyderabad and some others said that they were using the big stick. They were doing neither. What they were actually doing was to deal with the problem with gentlenesss and firmness. If gentleness was not effective they must use firmness. "We do not propose to make Hyderabad accede by coercion. We may be compelled to do it if the situation were such as to imperil security."

Pandit Nehru mentioned as an example of such a situation of Hyderabad being used as a base for operation by an enemy State.

Alternative Draft Heads of Agreement approved by the Hyderabad Council of Ministers on June 6, 1948.

1. The Nizam's Government agree that they will, on the request of the Government of India, enact legislation, similar to the legislation of the dominion of India in matters of Defence, External Affairs and Communications as enumerated in the attached schedule, provided that the term 'Government' in such legislation will mean the Nizam's Government and the adminstrative, judicial and executive authority under such legislation shall be exercised by the Nizam's Government.

2. The Nizam's Government undertake not to withhold or unduly delay the enactment of the legislation referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The Government of India expressly undertake:

(*a*) to respect the full sovereignty of the Nizam over his territory;

(*b*) to respect the territorial integrity of Hyderabad ; and

(*c*) not to pass any discriminatory legislation or administrative order against the interest of the State.

Both the Governments agree to do all they can to prevent and discourage subversive movements as also propaganda in their territory against each other.

DEFENCE.

4. The Nizam's Government agree to fix the strength of the Hyderabad Army at a figure not exeeding the overall strength of the 20,000 fighting troops and the Government of India undertake to provide arms, ammunition and equipment at fair cost to the Hyderabad Army, which will be organised according to the standards-obtaining in the Indian Army. The standard of armaments, equipment and ammunition will be standard for the time being applicable to the troops of the Indian Army. The Nizam's Government will afford facilities for periodical visit by Indian Army Officers to their troops and furnish information and returns to the Government of India from time to time and the Government of India will afford facilities to officers of Hyderabad Army to make periodical visits to the Indian Army Units to study the standards of efficiency. The Government of India will also provide at fair cost arms, equipment and ammunition for the Police force and the Civic Guard of the State.

(a) The number of troops of the Hyderabad Army which can be placed at the disposal of the Government of India in the event of external aggression will not exceed an overall figure of 5,000. The Hyderabad Forces shall not be used on *the active front* in the event of war against Pakistan.

(*b*) If the Government of India do not supply the requirements of Hyderabad within a reasonable time Hyderabad will be entitled to make such arrangements as it deems fit to procure arms, ammunition and equipment and in such an event the Government of India undertake to provide all transit facilities for the same through their territory.

5. The Nizam's Government agree to disband progressively their irregular forces in order finally to limit them to 8,000 but this will not apply to the ceremonial and house hold guards of the Sarf-e-Khas, Jagirs and Samasthan.

6. It is agreed that the Government of India will not station their armed forces inside Hyderabad State ; but during a state of war the Goveenment of India may, with the consent of the Nizam,

which will not be unreasonably withheld, station troops in Hyderabad territory, at such places only as may be approved by the Nizam's Government provided that any troops so stationed shall be withdrawn from the Hyderabad territory within three months of the cessation of hostilities. In such an event it is further agreed that the Government of India will pay compensation for the occupation of site, buildings and for other services.

7. If, as provided in para. 5 above, the Indian Army units are stationed in the Hyderabad State they will, while on duty or within the place where they are stationed, be subject to appropriate Dominion Law governing the armed forces of the Dominions.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

8. The Nizam's Government agree that the external relations of Hyderabad with any foreign country shall be conducted through the Government of India with due regard to the interests of Hyderabad and that Hyderabad will not have political relations with any country in the world but no treaty, engagement or convention between the Government of India and any foreign country affecting Hyderabad will be binding on the Nizam's Government without their consent. Hyderabad, however, will have freedom to build up commercial, fiscal and economic relations with other countries of the world and will be entitled to establish agencies in this behalf, and to exchange Agents-General with such countries but their Agents-General will work in the closest co-operation with the Government of India and will enjoy diplomatic status.

9. Hyderabad will also have the freedom of control over its own overseas and foreign export and import trade under its own authority which will be accepted at the ports of exit and entry, as the case may be, in the Dominion of India but the exchange transactions thereof shall be conducted through the Reserve Bank of India on behalf of the Government of Hyderabad. Hyderabad shall receive its share in the sterling balances and also its share in the sea-customs duties on all goods imported or exported by Hyderabad.

10. It is agreed that Hyderabad will be entitled to issue passports and that the form for such passports will indicate that the passports are being issued under agreement and in association with the Dominion of India.

11. The Government of India agree to assist Hyderabad to secure membership of the International Food Organization, the International Health Organization, the International Postal Union, the Inter-

national Monetary Fund and other Specialised Agencies of the U.N.O. as well as other non-political International Organizations.

12. The Government of India agree that Hyderabad shall maintain throughout the State its own coinage and currency.

COMMUNICATIONS.

13. It is agreed that Hyderabad will maintain its own Postal, Telegraph, Telephone and Wireless systems and the Government of India agree to make over such Post, Telegraph, Telephone, Telecommunication officers and equipment of the Dominion of India now operating within the State as also wireless and other instaliation connected with the operation of communication service with the exception of through telephone and telegraph lines that run through the State which will, however, be maintained by the State and for which the Indian Government will pay the necessary expenses.

14. The Government of India undertake to afford all facilities to connect and co-ordinate the Postal, Telegraph, Telephone and Wireless systems of Hyderabad with their own system.

15. The Government of India agree not to permit any air service to operate or fly over the territory of Hyderabad without the previous consent of the Nizam's Government.

GENERAL.

16. The Government of India agree to co-operare fully with the Nizam's Government and afford all facilities for the conduct and development of agriculture, trade, commerce, industries and other economic activities of Hyderabad.

17. The Government of India undertake to continue and give effect to the Berar Agreement of October, 1936, as if the Agreement was concluded between the parties to this Agreement.

18. The Government of India and the Nizam's Government agree to take necessary steps for exchange of such portions of their territories as form enclaves within the boundaries of the other and to set up necessary machinery for giving effect to this principle and till such time as the exchange is effected, movement of the Army, Police and other armed personnel shall take place only with the previous consent of the Government through whose territories such personnel have to pass.

19. The Government of India agree to hand over forthwith to the Nizam's Government possession and ownership over all civil, military and Air Force buildings in the retroceded cantonments and administered areas situated in the State provided that no cost or compensation will be payable in respect of pre-war permanent military buildings and civil buildings the cost of which has been met from the Abkari or Cantonment funds and that compensation will be paid for temporary buildings constructed during the war at a valuation calculated on the same basis as adopted for the purchase of R. A. F. temporary structures by the Nizam's Government.

20. As from the date of the signing of this Agreement the Stand-still Agreement concluded between the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Berar and the Dominion of India will terminate.

21. Nothing herein contained shall include or introduce paramountcy functions.

Nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to create in favour of either party, any right continuing after the date of termination of this Agreement and nothing herein contained and nothing done in pursuance hereof shall be deemed to derogate from any right which, but for this Agreement, would have been exercisable by either party to it after the date of termination hereof.

22. The Government of India and the Nizam's Government agree for the better execution of the purpose of this Agreement to appoint Agent-General in Hyderabad and Delhi respectively and to give every facility and extend the usual diplomatic courtesy to them for the discharge of their functions.

23. Any dispute or difference between the parties arising hereout or touching any matter connected herewith shall unless settled by mutual adjustment be referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties, and an umpire appointed by such arbitrators.

SCHEDULE.

The matters with respect to which the Nizam's Government agree to pass such legislation as the Government of India may request them to enact.

A. Defence.

1. The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other armed forces raised or maintained by the Dominion ;

any armed forces including forces raised or maintained by the State, which are attached to, or operating with, any of the armed forces of the Dominion.

2. Naval, military and air force work.

3. Arms : firearms : ammunition.

4. Explosives.

B. External Affairs.

1. External Affairs ; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries, extradition, including the surrender of criminal and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's dominions outside India.

2. Admission into and emigration and expulsion from, India, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are not British subjects domiciled in India or subjects of any acceding State ; pilgrimages to places beyond India.

3. Naturalization.

C. Communications.

1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication,

2. Federal railways : the regulation of all railways other than minor railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service terminal charges, intercharge of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers ; the regulation of minor railways in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers.

3. Carriage of passengers and goods by air.

Extract from "The Hindu" (Madras), dated June 7, 1948, of a speech delivered by Pandit Nehru in Delhi on June 6.

....Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to the people to put down all "separatist tendencies" and act as a united force to solve the numerous problems facing India. India he said, must consolidate her position immediately if it wanted to exist as an independent country in the present-day world........

Pandit Nehru said: "In my opinion, Hyderabad neither can nor should leave India, because geographically it is so situated that it cannot join any country other than India and economically also, it is very much dependent on us."........

Except in Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru continued, all over India, in provinces as well as in States, the people enjoyed Responsible Government and it was impossible for Hyderabad to stand against the tide of the time and continue with its mediaeval feudal system of Government. India, he said, would not tolerate that the people of Hyderabad should live in prepetual slavery or that the State should exist as a sovereign unit. "An independent State right in the middle of India would be dangerous for our own defence."

They wanted to find a practical solution to the question without having to add to their difficulties. The Government of India had dealt with Hyderabad leniently when leniency was required and with firmness when that was called for. They had strengthened their army and at the same time they were constantly endeavouring to end the deadlock in a peaceful and friendly way.

Note of an interview between the Governor-General of India and the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, 4 p. m., Monday, June 7, 1948. Sir Walter Monckton was also present.

The Governor-General emphasised that he was speaking without having previously been briefed by his Government. In the course of discussion, the following points were made, to serve as a basis for subsequent talks:—

(a) It was generally agreed that the holding of a plebiscite in Hyderabad, on the issue of whether the State should acceded to India or remain independent, was the obvious ultimate solution.

(*b*) It was pointed out that whatever the advantages of a plebiscite as the long-term settlement, no such settlement would

be worth the paper it was written on unless good-will was immediately re-established between India and Hyderabad. Therefore the only basis on which it was possible to work was that an interim settlement which would restore friendship should also be reached.

(*c*) There were certain points which India could contribute to such a short-term settlement. Among these were:—

(*i*) The replacement of certain personnel;

(*ii*) A visit by the Governor-General to Hyderabad;

(*iii*) The lifting of the present so-called 'blockade' and arrangements for the positive movement of goods into Hyderabad to be recommenced immediately.

(*d*) So far as Hyderabad's contribution to a short-term settlement and the re-establishment of good relations was concerned, the most important step would be the formation of a completely new Government on a parity basis. It was recognized that although the Government of India might have difficulty in agreement to parity it was impossible for Hyderabad to go beyond this. But this reconstitution of the Government would have to be genuine; it would involve the dissolution of the present Government and the formation of a new one, although certain Ministers in the present Government might be appointed to the new one.

(*e*) The new Government might consist of 12 (or possibly 10) seats. Half of this number, including the protfolio of Prime Minister, would be allocated to each major community; and there should be an equitable distribution of portfolios. In order to achieve representation of the existing legislature in the new Government two of the six seats allocated to Hindus might be given to members of the present Legislature; similarly the Muslim representation might include one or two who were not members of the Ittehad.

(*f*) Hyderabad intended to form a new Constituent Assembly, elected on a broad-based franchise and on a parity basis within two or three months. When this had been formed, if it truly reflected the two major communities, it might act temporarily as the Legislature.

(*g*) It might be agreed that the present Legislature would not be called until this Constituent Assembly was formed, and was sitting.

(*h*) The question arose as to what should be the controlling authority for this plebiscite. It was generally agreed that it would

be desirable for the plebiscite to be run by an outside body. It was pointed out that the Government of India might well, but for recent events in connection with Kashmir, have agreed to the selection of the United Nations Organization. But this was improbable in present circumtances. Other possibilities were :—

(*i*) The Commonwealth ;

(*ii*) A small panel of judges from the permanent Court of International Justice, or

(*iii*) A Commission from a completely neutral country such as Switzerland or Sweden.

(*i*) So far as preparations for the plebiscite were concerned, there should be free speech, freedom of the press and free access to the radio for all parties within Hyderabad. There might, with advantage, be a gentleman's understanding that neither party would attack or vilify the other, but confine itself to drawing attention to the advantages which the course of action which it represented offered. No Government, and no Government sponsored organization, would spend any money in electioneering or in bribery of any sort prior to the plebiscite. There would be no interference by any party or organization from outside the State.

Minutes of Meeting held in New Delhi on June 9, 1948

PRESENT

1. H. E. MIR LAIK ALI, *Prime Minister of Hyderabad.*	1. MR. V. P. MENON, *Secretary State Ministry.*
2. THE HON. MR. P. V. REDDY	2. MR. N. M. BUCH, *Joint Secy. State Ministry.*
3. THE HON. MR. ABDUR RAUF.	3. MR. H. M. PATEL, *Defence Secretary, Govt. of India.*
4. MR. ZAHIR AHMED.	

(*Sir Walter Monckton, Nizam's Constitutional Adviser, was also present*)

Before any discussion started Mr. Menon said that he had come from the Prime Minister of India and would like certain things to be firstly conveyed on his (Prime Minister) behalf to the Hyderabad Delegation before proceeding with any discussion. He asked Mr. Buch to read out a telegram received from the Government of Bombay. The telegram reported an incident on the Bijapur border said to have taken place soon after 6 p.m. on the 5th instant somewhere near the

village Salvetgi. The telegrams said that some Hyderabad Police personnel or Razakars had shot down by a machine gun in the Union territory five Bombay Policemen and two villagers and wounded one Police Head Constable and two villagers. Mr. Menon said that the Prime Minister of India had asked him to make it clear that in future if border incidents of this description happened the Indian troops and the Indian Police had orders to go into the State territory to catch the culprits. The Government of India demanded that the culprits should be caught and compensation be paid. The Prime Minister of Hyderabad said that it was the first time he had heard about it and that he was not in a position to say any thing about the alleged incident but would cause enquiries to be made and certainly do the needful.

Mr. Menon then said that "at the present moment the Government of India does not know where they stand for the Prime Minister of India has reliable information that there is a Pakistan Government Delegation or Pakistan Government representative in Hyderabad at present and is discussing with the Hyderabad Government the relations between India and Hyderabad." The Prime Minister of Hyderabad most emphatically and categorically denied the presence of any Delegation or representative from the Pakistan Government coming to Hyderabad and said that it was surprising that such a serious allegation was being made.

Mr. Menon in the same strain continued that the Government of India wanted that Hyderabad should accede to the Dominion of India and to grant full responsible government to the people but until such time as complete accession and full responsible government came into being the Government of India was anxious to see that :—

(1) Hyderabad should accede in substance to the Dominion of India on the three subjects of defence, external affairs and communications. To this end Hyderabad should accept over-riding powers of the Dominion of India, *i.e.*, if Hyderabad Government fails to introduce parallel legislation the legislation of the Dominion of India should *ipso facto* be introduced.

(2) Responsible government in substance should be introduced immediately and that the Government of India do not accept the basis of parity.

(3) The Razakars should immediately be disbanded.

(4) That the over-all strength of the Hyderabad Army cannot be allowed to be more than 20,000.

These conditions, Mr. Menon said, were for the interim period, otherwise the Government of India stand for full accession and full

responsible government. When the Prime Minister of Hyderabad pointed out that Hyderabad was agreeable to a plebiscite being held to decide whether Hyderabad should be independent or should accede to the Indian Dominion, Mr. Menon said that Hyderabad should now accede in substance and leave it to be confirmed by the plebiscite. The Prime Minister of Hyderabad said that the grant of responsible government was a matter entirely between the Ruler and its people. Mr. Menon said that he and his Government were not prepared to accept that it was an internal matter, for he maintained that the grant of responsible government was a concern of the Government of India and that it was on no account an internal matter. He added that sovereignty ultimately rested with the people and that responsible government was therefore inevitable.

Sir Walter Monckton then referred to the draft heads of agreement which was prepared on the basis of the draft heads of agreement given to Hyderabad previously by the Government of India. Mr. Menon said that he and his Government were not prepared to look at any draft of heads of agreement unless they were given "*here and now*" overriding powers of legislation in matters of defence, external affairs and communications and unless responsible government was granted in substance reflecting the position of the majority community.

The conversation then followed on general lines and at the end of it the Prime Minister of Hyderabad conveyed the following reply on behalf of the Hyderabad delegation :—

" The Hyderabad Delegation in reply to the line taken by the Government of India and expressed through Mr. V. P. Menon stated that it has come to New Delhi to meet the Government of India on the issue of determining the future Indo-Hyderabad relationship according to one of the alternative bases which had been suggested by the Government of India, *viz.*, plebiscite to say whether Hyderabad should accede to India or remain independent. Hyderabad had agreed to this course for determining the future relationship in order to resolve the continued disagreement between India and Hyderabad. The Government of India now desire that in the event of agreement on the plebiscite Hyderabad should here and now accede to India in substance by giving forthwith overriding powers in legislation in the matter of defence, external affairs and communications. The Government of India also desire that the Razakar organisation should be banned at once and responsible government should be introduced in substance by setting up a representative interim Government forthwith reflecting the position of the majority community. The Government of India also make it clear that they were not prepared to discuss any other arrangement with Hyderabad either of a temporary or a long term

nature which did not meet their wishes as outlined above fully and immediately.

"The Hyderabad Delegation regretted that the Government of India should have decided on a course of action entirely against the line adopted by them so far and have now presented a situation that Hyderabad should accept the terms communicated or reject them.

"The Hyderabad Delegation has to state that they are not empowered to meet the demands now made by the Government of India and the final reply, therefore, whether or not to accept these demands can only be given by the Nizam. The Hyderabad delegation will place the entire situation before the Nizam on their return to Hyderabad tomorrow."

Letter, dated June, 1948, from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of State.

You indicated during the conversation this morning that the Union troops and Union police were being instructed to enter the State territory to chase the "border raiders." In this matter I am desired to point out that, while the Hyderabad Government is anxious and fully prepared to co-operate in every way to prevent border incidents, they consider that it is not proper for the Government of India to make a unilateral decision to issue instructions—which you said were being issued—to the Union troops and the Union police.

I am, therefore, to request you to kindly see that Hyderabad borders are not crossed by the Union troop or police The Government of Hyderabad will make every endeavour to prevent border incidents arising within their territory and will be only too glad to provide every facility and assistance on a reciprocal basis to the authorities of the neighbouring Provinces in putting down lawlessness. I may observe that the arrangements which existed before August 15th with regard to hot-pursuit might with advantage be followed if lawlessness is to be effectively put down.

Press Note, dated June 10, 1948, issued by the Director, Information Bureau, the Nizam's Government.

In order to avoid the possibility of a clash with Indian Union forces, orders have been given that all Hyderabad troops should be withdrawn to a line three miles within the Hyderabad frontier.

Letter, dated June 11, 1948, from the Secretary to the Nizam's Government, External Affairs Department, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of States.

During the Indo-Hyderabad conversation at Government House, New Delhi, on June 2, on behalf of the Prime Minister of India, made a very serious allegation that a Pakistan Government delegation or representative was then in Hyderabad. Despite an immediate and emphatic denial by our Prime Minister, the charge was repeated later during the negotiations.

The Nizam's Government strongly protest at this unwarranted allegation which, as stated by our Prime Minister, is untrue. The Nizam's Government must request that the "reliable information" from which the charge is said to have originated should be communicated to them, as they take a very grave view of such baseless and provocative charges.

Statement to the Press by the Prime Minister of Hyderabad on June 11, 1947.

The Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, in a review of this week's Indo-Hyderabad negotiations, said tonight that the discussions were not successful because the Government of India had suddenly adopted a line of action entirely different from that they had previously followed.

The Hyderabad delegation, said Mir Liak Ali, had gone to New Delhi prepared to accept one of the alternatives suggested by the Government of India to determine future relations between Hyderabad and India—a plebiscite to decide whether Hyderabad should accede to India or remain independent.

On their arrival the Hyderabad delegates had been told that the Government of India demanded that Hyderabad must at once accede to India in substance on the three subjects of defence, external affairs and communications by giving India overriding powers if the Hyderabad Government failed to introduce parallel laws. India also demanded that responsible Government in substance should be introduced immediately in accordance with the lines determined by the Government of India.

Mir Laik Ali said that, when he had pointed out the Hyderabad was agreeable to the holding of a plebiscite to decide whether Hyderabad should acede to India, the Indian reply was the Hyderabad should at once accede in substance and leave this decision to be confirmed by a plebiscite. The Government of India similarly insisted

on their view that responsible government was mainly an internal matter.

"The Government of India," said Mir Laik Ali, "made it clear that they were not prepared to discuss any arrangement either of a temporary or long-term nature which did not meet their wishes fully and immediately. The Hyderabad delegation expressed their regret that the Government of India should have decided on this course, entirely against the line adopted by them previously. They stated that they were not empowered to meet the demands now made and must place the new situation before the Nizam."

For the present, said Mir Laik Ali, it was essential that people on both sides of the border should maintain calm and that public men in India and Hyderabad should refrain from indiscreet and unguarded utterances likely to inflame passions. He said that he condemned strong language and irritating expression in public utterances as they did no good to anyone. Question about the recent speech made by Mr. Qasim Razvi when he said to have used strong language, Mir Laik Ali said that his remarks applied to everyone.

Mir. Laik Ali said that he did not know whether talks could be resumed. World opinion, he felt sure, would be with Hyderabad. The Nizam had offered to abide by the will of his people as ascertained by a plebiscite under the General supervision of any international organization. There could be no fairer decision than that and it was regrettable that the leaders of the Government in India should be unwilling to await the verdict of the people.

Mir. Laik Ali revealed that the Hyderabad Government were again protesting to the Government of India about violations of Hyderabad's frontiers and particularly the participation in border raids by personnel of the Indian Army and Police. The Nizam's Government he said, were asking the Government of India to take immediate and effective steps to control these forces' lawlessness, which was prejudicing Hyderabad's consistent efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border regions.

Deprecating hostile propaganda against Hyderabad in India, the Prime Minister instanced a report by the Government of Bombay to the Government of India that, on June 5, Hyderabad policemen or Razakar invaded Bombay territory and inflicted casualties. This report was a completely distorted account of an attack by Indian Union national on Hyderabad territory: the Bombay Government sought to make Hyderabad appear an aggressor when it was, in fact, attacked.

Extract from " The Hindu " (Madras), dated June 12, 1948, of a speech by Pandit Nehru at Nainital on June 11.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, in a 90-minute speech before a vast gathering here this evening, referred to the Hyderabad and Kashmir issues......

Pandit Nehru said independent Hyderabad was full of dangers to India. Accession of Hyderabad to India would mean that " we give it a place of honour and dignity and make it our partner to share the country's freedom."......

Pandit Nehru made it clear that the India Government did not wish, to interfere in the administration of Hyderabad, but at the same time, they would not permit any foreign power or agency or vested interest to establish themselves in the State. Such a course, he said, would be a challenge to the security of India.

Pandit Nehru referred to the criticism by British-owned newspapers in India and abroad which accused the Government of India of threatening and coercing Hyderabad. At the same time, said Pandit Nehru, Indian newspapers charges the Government with adopting a weak and vascillating policy towards that State. In such circumstances, the Government of India had to take strong steps, not to defeat Hyderabad because conflicts were always bad, but to create the India of our dreams. To achieve that dream, it would not matter if a dilapidated building was pulled down.

Pandit Nehru was cheered when he said there was talk of a completely independent and sovereign Hyderabad. That was absurd talk, Hyderabad could be independent only if India died and not before........

Pandit Nehru said with some emphasis: " We have always before us the picture of an ideal India. Keeping that picture in mind, we shall force the pace and face any impediment that may come in our way in solving the Hyderabad issue."

Proposals made to the Government of India by the Prime Minister of Hyderabad on June 14, 1948.

The Hyderabad Council of Ministers on June 13 considered further recommendations contained in a letter sent from Delhi by Sir Walter Monckton. The Council agreed that His Excellency the Prime Minister (Mir Laik Ali), the Deputy Prime Minister (the Hon'ble Mr. Pingle

Venkatrama Reddy) and the Minister for Public Works (the Hon'ble Mr. Abdur Raoof) should go to Delhi on June 14 and make every attempt " to conclude a friendly agreement with the Government of India " on the following conditions :

Wording of clause 1 of the revised draft agreement as previously approved by the Council should be substantially maintained.

Wording of clause 2 may read " if the Nizam's Government fails to pass the required legislation with reasonable despatch but not later than a period of three months, the Nizam himself will pass the necessary ordinance under his inherent powers."

There should be a clause wherein any discriminatory legislation against Hyderabad should be properly safeguarded.

It may be made clear to the Government of India that the Razakar is a movement and not an organization and is directly the product of the present day circumstances. A change in the circumstances would take away the main motive force of the movement and it will be possible then for the Government to pursue a policy by which the quasi-military characteristic of the movement will not continue.

The strength of the Hyderabad Army may be limited to an overall figure of 20,000 provided that it leaves no commitment on the part of Hyderabad to lend any of its State forces for the defence of India and that any understanding in this regard is not based on the 1939 Scheme which is no more operative, and that the Government of India undertake to supply arms and ammunition in accordance with the standard of the Indian forces to meet the full requirements of the Army, Police and Civic Guards of the State and that in the event of the Government of India not supplying the requirements, Hyderabad to receive full facilities for the import of the requisite arms and ammunition from any source abroad.

The provisions contained in para. 6 of the revised heads of the Agreement to be retained in full.

Hyderabad to limit its irregular forces to 8,000 and to maintain the other ceremonial forces of Sarf-e-Khas, *Jagirs* and *Samasthans.*

Hyderabad to have freedom of control over its own overseas and foreign export and import trade under its own authority subject to the exchange transactions being conducted through the Reserve Bank of India for and on behalf of the Government of Hyderabad and Hyderabad to receive its due share in the sterling balances and allocation of

exchange to the extent of import licenses already granted. Hyderabad also to receive the full support of the Indian Dominion in its application for membership to the specialised agencies of the United Nations Organization and other international non-political organisation and to have a special position in regard to passport for its subject and to be allowed its share of import and export duties and to be assisted in regard to maintenance of its own currency, postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless systems, the Indian Union to hand over forthwith its Post, telegraph and telephonic organisations operating in the State and all these points to be definitely incorporated in the draft heads of the Agreement.

A clear provision should be included in regard to arbitration.

In the event of the Indian Union agreeing to lift the economic blockade against Hyderabad and making effective arrangements for the immediate and unrestricted movement of goods and merchandise of all descriptions into and out of Hyderabad and of the Government of India agreeing to make a public announcement expressing their good-will and satisfaction over the new arrangements negotiated be-ween the two Governments, the Council decided to recommend to the Nizam to issue a *Firman-e-Mubarak* on the lines of the draft attached.

DRAFT FIRMAN

1. After protracted discussion between my Government and the Government of India, I am now in a position to announce the lines of my policy. I am most anxious to put an end to the uncertainties which prevail as to the nature of the relationship between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India. The views of the Dominion of India have been made clear to me and mine are well known to them. I have now decided to consult the will of my people upon the question whether Hyderabad should accede to India. I shall, therefore, take a plebiscite in Hyderabad on the basis of adult franchise. In order to ensure that the plebiscite is fairly conducted, I shall arrange for it to be held under the supervision of some impartial and independent body. I shall agree and approve the result of the plebiscite whatever it may be.

3. But I am satisfied that more is required than the holding of a plebiscite, in order to restore confidence and tranquillity. I have, therefore, decided to instruct my Government to proceed in accordance with the following principles. In doing so, they will appreciate that the re-establishment of mutual good-will between India and Hyderabad is the object of my policy and is of greater importance than the terms

of my agreement which may be reached between India and Hyderabad in accordance with these principles.

(*i*) It is my intention to introduce responsible government in Hyderabad and to establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949 keeping in view the tradition of Hyderabad and on a basis which I shall determine later.

(*ii*) In the meantime, there should be a reconstitution of my Government as a result of which a new interim Government will be formed. In this Government half of seats will be allocated to each major community and there will be an equitable distribution of portfolio.

(*iii*) My Government has been able to reach agreement with the Government of India on the nature of the interim relationship between Hyderabad and India pending the holding of the plebiscite. This agreement which involves some modification of the existing Standstill Agreement, has been embodied in a separate document signed by my Prime Minister.

———

Letter, dated June 15, 1948, from the Governor-General of India to the Nizam.

(1) It gives me very pleasure to be able to write to you at last the long and protracted negotiations between Hyderabad and India are drawing to their successful conclusion, because Mir Laik Ali is taking down to you today the final papers which have been agreed up here, Subject to Your Extalted Highness' ratification.

(2) The situation has not been easy to hold here, and we are all agreed that the matter must be concluded today, Tuesday, without fail in the interest of good feeling and friendship.

(3) I only have five days left in India, and they are very fully taken up indeed with meetings and farewell lunches, receptions and dinners. It will be difficult to find the time to come to Hyderabad but I am so anxious to be able to express the good-will of India in person to you before I go, that I will somehow find the time to get down even if it is only for two or three hours, for I should much like to renew our acquaintance before I leave.

Draft documents printed to the Hyderabad Delegation in New Delhi by the Government of India on June 15, 1948.

LETTER

FROM PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA.

TO PRIME MINISTER OF HYDERABAD.

In connection with the agreement which has to-day been signed between the Government of India and the Government of Hyderabad, I have to state that:—

1. The Government of India will do their utmost to ensure that the flow of goods of all kinds at present held up between Hyderabad and India is resumed and maintained.

2. The Government of India wish to collaborate on a joint basis in the economic development of Hyderabad, and to afford all facilities to this end.

3. It is not the policy of the Government of India that there should be any unfair discrimination against Hyderabad in the working of the new agreement.

4. In the course of discussions the representatives of the Hyderabad Government raised the questions of:—

(a) Hyderabad having freedom of control over overseas export and import trade under its own authority, the transactions thereof being conducted through the Reserve Bank of India.

(b) The question of Hyderabad becoming a member of some international organisations, i.e., Food Organisation, Postal Union, Health Organisation, International Monetary Fund.

These questions cannot be considered in isolation and have to be decided with reference to the constitution of these organisations and the Government of India's relations with them. The Government of India, however, is prepared to consider these matters sympathetically with the representatives of the Hyderabad Government.

FIRMAN

1. After protracted discussions between my Government and the Government of India, I am now in a position to announce the lines of my policy. I am most anxious to put an end to the uncertainties which prevail as to the nature of the relationship between Hyderabad and the Dominion of India. The views of the Dominion of India have been made clear to me and mine are well known to them. I have now decided to consult the will of my people upon the question whether Hyderabad should accede to India. I shall, therefore, take a plebiscite in Hyderabad on the basis of adult franchise. In order to ensure that the plebiscite is fairly conducted, I shall arrange for it to be held under the supervision of some impartial and independent body. I shall accept the result of the plebiscite whatever it may be.

2. But I am satisfied that more is required than the holding of a plebiscite, in order to restore confidence and tranquillity. I have, therefore, decided to instruct my Government to proceed in accordance with the following principles. In doing so, they will appreciate that the re-establishment of good-will between India and Hyderabad is the object of my policy and is of greater importance than the terms of any agreement which may be reached between India and Hyderabad in accordance with these principles.

(i) It is my intention to introduce Responsible Government in Hyderabad and to that end to establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949.

(ii) In the meantime, there should be a reconstitution of my Government as a result of which a new Interim Government will be formed, in consultation with the leaders of the major political parties.

(iii) My Government has been able to reach agreement with the Government of India on the nature of the interim relationship between Hyderabad and India pending the holding of the plebiscite. This agreement, which involves some modification of the existing Standstill Agreement, has been embodied in a separate document signed by my Prime Minister.

HEADS OF AGREEMENT

General.

1. The Nizam's Government agree that they will on the request of the Government of India, pass legislation similar to the legislation of the Government of India on any matter enumerated in the schedule attached.

2. If the Nizam's Government fails to pass the required legislation with due despatch, the Nizam himself will forthwith pass the necessary ordinance under his own powers.

DEFENCE.

3. The Dominion Government agree to fix the strength of the Hyderabad Army at a figure not exceeding an overall strength of 20,000. The provisions of the Indian State Forces Scheme of 1939 will apply *mutatis mutandis* to these Forces and the Government of India undertake to supply arms, ammunition and equipment on the scales and conditions laid down in the Scheme. The Government of India will have the right of periodical inspection and the Nizam's Government will also give all facilities in regard to such inspection and furnish such information and returns as they may be requested to do by the Government of India from time to time.

4. The Nizam's Government agree to limit their irregular forces to 8,000 in addition to ceremonial and household guards. The Hyderabad Government agree that all other formations of a military character shall be disbanded. Progressive steps will be taken for the disbandment of the Razakars within three months; rallies, parades, demonstrations and speeches by Razakars will cease forthwith.

5. It is agreed that the Government of India will not station their armed forces inside Hyderabad State; but, if in an emergency the Government of India wish to station their forces inside the State for the period of a state of emergency declared in India by the Government of India under Section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, this will be agreed to by the Hyderabad Government. In such an event it is further agreed that the Government of India will be willing to pay to Hyderabad nominal compensation for the occupation of buildings in the State and for other services.

6. If, in any emergency as above, Indian Army units are stationed in the Hyderabad State they will be subject to the appropriate Dominion Law governing the armed forces of the Dominion.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

7. It is agreed that Hyderabad's external relations with any foreign country shall be conducted by the Government of India, Hyderabad will, however, have freedom to establish trade agencies in order to build up commercial, fiscal and economic relations with other countries; but these agencies will work under the general supervision of, and in the closest co-operation with, the Government

of India. Hyderabad will not have any political relations with any country.

CONTINUANCE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS.

8. Subject to the above paragraphs, the existing agreements and administrative arrangements in regard to matters of common concern shall continue and will be given effect to by both sides. The said agreements and arrangements shall not cease to have effect on 29th November, 1948, as was provided in Article V of the Standstill Agreement of 29th November, 1947.

....

On behalf of the Government of India. On behalf of the Government of Hyderabad.

15th June 1948.

SCHEDULE.

A. DEFENCE.

1. Any armed forces raised or maintained by Hyderabad, whether within or without the State.

2. Naval, military and air force works.

3. Arms; firearms; ammunition.

4. Explosives.

B. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

1. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries; extradition.

2. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, Hyderabad, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in Hyderabad of persons who are not Hyderabad subjects.

3. Naturalisation.

C. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication.

2. Railways of the Government of India in the State ; the regulation of the Nizam's State Railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and service terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers ; the regulation of other railways in the State in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers.

3. Aircraft and air navigation ; regulation and organisation of air traffic and aerodromes ; provisions for the safety of aircraft ; carriage of passengers and goods by air.

Telegram, dated June 16, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India

I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your letter of fifteenth June sent through my Prime Minister who has also presented to me full report over the points on which there have been differences. I greatly appreciate the efforts which Your Excellency has all along made to bridge the gulf between India and Hyderabad and it is my earnest wish that a settlement of the Indo-Hyderabad problem is soon arrived at. At this crucial stage I found it necessary to consult my Council over the issues involved. The most serious difference found is in the draft *Firman* which has now been materially altered by omitting the words, " on a basis which I shall consider later," in para. (2) sub-para (1) which were already agreed previously through Monckton, and by completely changing the wording of sub-para. (2) which gives it a different complexion altogether from the original draft received from Delhi. These changes were found in the final copies given to my Prime Minister yesterday towards the end of his meeting with you and which he discovered on his return. There is also the very vital issue of freedom in trade, economic and fiscal matters which have been left over for sympathetic consideration without accepting it even in principle which has been an inherent right. There is no provision regarding arbitration which as already in the existing Standstill Agreement is necessary so as to provide for amicable settlement of any possible differences in future. Under the circumstances the Council find themselves unable to recommend the acceptance of the revised draft and, and taking the situation in the country into account, I am in full agreement with my Council. I still hope it will be possible for Your Excellency to consider over the above points and accommodate Hyderabad's views so as to arrive at a satisfactory agreement. I shall be glad to arrange further visit of my Ministers to assist in the matter if necessary. I wish again to express my deep sense of appreciation for the interest Your Excellency has taken in these matters.

Telegram, dated June 17, 1948, from the Nizam to the Governor-General of India.

As your Excellency knows Sir Walter Monckton flew down from Delhi during the night and has seen me this morning. He has satisfied me that the changes in the draft *Firman* to which I referred in my telegram of sixteenth June were contained in drafts which he saw on Monday fourteenth June and that he thought that my Prime Minister had received copies on the afternoon of the same day. In these circumstances I am anxious to take the first opportunity of correcting the impression contained in my telegram that the changes were not made known to my representatives in Delhi until the last moment. Many drafts were being prepared upon both sides and the members of my delegation were constantly engaged in discussions with Your Excellency and various representatives of your Government so that a misunderstanding on this matter could easily arise. My telegram had to be sent when Sir Walter Monckton was in Delhi. If he had been here the mistake could not have arisen.

(2) Although the negotiations have been protracted and we all want to reach a final agreement I am afraid it is impossible to do so within a day or two. We are now within sight of a settlement on most of the important issues but there remain questions upon which agreement must be reached before the final result which we both desire can be achieved. I cannot doubt that we could reach accord on the outstanding questions of phraseology in the *Firman* but my Council are also greatly troubled about the refusal of India to agree even in principle to fiscal freedom and control over Hyderabad's overseas and export trade being secured to the State. My Prime Minister drew attention to this important matter at an earlier stage in his discussions with Pandit Nehru and yourself. Later a draft giving effect to our suggestion was furnished to Mr. Menon. I can understand that the subject is one which will require examination in detail but I must ask for the principle to be conceded. Further my Council cannot advise me to agree to leaving India free to station troops except in the border areas of the State whenever India chooses to declare a state of emergency. I should be found very ready to co-operate in any grave emergency. There is also the question of arbitration to which I referred in my previous telegram.

(3) While for these reasons I cannot accept the drafts in their present form I earnestly hope that negotiations will be continued and a settlement reached in a very short time. Hyderabad will always owe much of its success in finding a happy compromise to Your Excellency's readiness to help us on our way and for this we shall always be grateful.

Communique, dated June 17, 1948, issued by the Nizam's Government.

In response to the oft-repeated suggestion made to the Nizam by the Government of India, the Nizam agreed to leave it to the people of his State to decide whether Hyderabad should remain independent or accede to India. He chose the accepted most democratic method of determining the will of his subjects, *i.e.*, by means of plebiscite. In order that the verdict might be free and impartial the Nizam offered to conduct the plebiscite under the general supervision of a neutral and impartial organization or body, such as the United Nations or the International Court of Justice.

The final choice having been left to be decided by the popular will, it was expected that interim arrangements to last till the verdict was announced would present no difficulties. This was not to be. The Government of India demanded that the substance of accession should also be conceded immediately, irrespective of what the decision of the plebiscite might be. This was obviously unfair and amounted to prejudicing the popular will.

Although internal arrangements in Hyderabad are no concern of the Government of India, the Nizam's Government agreed to a discussion on these subjects with a view to facilitating an amicable settlement with India. But in this sphere also the Government of India proposed radical changes during the interim period.

The Nizam's Government are strongly of opinion that, in the special circumstances of Hyderabad, sudden changes in the present structure would give rise to serious political controversies and conflicts—conditions that would be most unsuited for the holding of a plebiscite on the crucial question of Hyderabad's future relations with the Government of India.

As regards Hyderabad's other demands, the Government of India would not agree to give any assurance that the State would have economic and fiscal freedom and freedom of overseas trade. They would not even accept these freedoms in principle, although Hyderabad was willing that the terms and details should be worked out later.

It is clear that what the Government of India wanted was that Hyderabad should concede all their demands because of India's superior position and would not commit themeslves on anything, even on broad principles. The Nizam's decision to abide by the verdict of his people on the question of future relations with India did not in any way influence India's attitude, which throughout the long negotiations

was one of dictation and coercion. The Government of India would not agree to consider the proposals made by Hyderabad in regard to the future relationship with India and insisted on imposing their own proposals. To this the Nizam's Government could never agree.

The promises made by the Government of India when the Standstill Agreement was signed and afterwards with regard to the removal of restrictions on the flow of goods and essential commodities into Hyderabad have not been fulfilled. Vitally necessary supplies of arms and ammunition were withheld while subversive activities in the border areas increased. Today Hyderabad is facing a total blockade and the very necessities of life, including salt and medical supplies, are being denied to its people. An organised propaganda campaign has been launched against the State, while repeated requests made by the State to resolve the differences by arbitration under the terms of the Standstill Agreement have been refused by the Government of India.

In spite of all this, Hyderabad never deviated from the path of peaceful negotiation. Hyderabad is anxious to forge friendly ties with the Indian Union and is prepared for an honourable settlement with the Dominion.

Extract from *THE STATESMAN* (Calcutta and Delhi), dated June 18, 1948, of a statement by Pandit Nehru at a Press Conference in New Delhi on June 17, 1948.

Pandit Nehru, India's Prime Minister, at a Press conference today said that the draft agreement, which was agreed to by the Hyderabad delegation, but was later disapproved by the Nizam, was the "utmost limit the Government of India would go and is not variable in any way." He pointed out that India would not undertake any further protracted negotiations with Hyderabad in the matter..........

"The proposals embodied in the draft agreement," Pandit Nehru declared, " will stand, and the Nizam can sign on the dotted line as and when he likes. We will pursue an open door policy so far as these proposals are concerned and the Nizam is welcome to accept them at any time he chooses. "

"In the meantime, we will continue our policy, which comprises economic blockade to some extent and the tightening of the border. We will not and are not waiting for the signing of the agreement by the Nizam. We are taking such steps as are warranted by the situation."..........

Pandit Nehru, who was delayed in arriving at the Press Conference, said that he expected Sir Walter Monckton back from Hyderabad this evening and he thought it would be fair to wait for him so that the Press might have the latest news. Referring to the draft agreement and the draft *Firman*, which were circulated, he said that at the present moment these were of historical interest only, but would enable the public to know the basis on which the Government of India were proceeding. Apart from the agreement which was to have been signed the *Firman* would have been issued by the Nizam. As far as the Government of India was concerned, the *Firman* was important, hence, in a sense, it became part of the draft agreement.

After explaining these two documents, the Prime Minister said that this was the last document that was presented in the course of conversations. Apart from these documents it was proposed that he (Pandit Nehru) would give a collateral letter to the Hyderabad Government to make one or two points clear. They included, for instance, that the Government of India would do its utmost to ensure a free flow of goods of all kinds to Hyderabad ; secondly, that the Government of India would co-operate on a joint basis on the economic development of Hyderabad and afford all facilities to them ; and thirdly, that it was not the policy of the Government of India that there should be any unfair discrimination against Hyderabad in the working of the new agreement.

During the last 10 days, Pandit Nehru said, various proposals had been discussed between the representatives of India and Hyderabad and ultimately they had taken shape in the form of the two documents now released. Meanwhile, there were at least two visits to Hyderabad of the Nizam's representatives taking back these proposals in some form or other and the impression was that these proposals were agreed to the Nizam's representatives here. He had, in fact, made it clear to them, even before they came on the last occasion, that there was not much point in taking the trouble to come over unless they accepted the basis of these proposals and unless they came with plenipotentiary authority to come to an agreement. It was really on that basis that the talks had proceeded.

The Prime Minister said : " The principal matters contained in these proposals were more or less accepted by the Nizam's representatives here. In fact we thought that we were going to proceed to sign them when we were told that they wanted to take it back to Hyderabad to consult the Nizam. But one of our difficulties in this business has been in dealing with persons who cannot say ' yes ' or ' no ' definitely but continually wanted to fly back to Hyderabad, inspite of the fact that they are connected by telephone

and continually telephoning each other. This made it very difficult to get on and numerous unnecessary delays took place. Anyhow the position at present is that this latest agreement has not been accepted by the Hyderabad Government or the Nizam.

" They have not said that the negotiations are over. In fact, they have suggested in a telegram which came just an hour ago that they would like to carry on talks, but as the draft stands at present they are unable to agree to it. So far as we are concerned, we have given, naturally, a great deal of thought and attention to this matter for the last few months.

"It is not for me to enter into long explanation or justification of the attitude of the Government of India in this matter but I now stand by everything that the Government of India has done in this matter and I think both these criticisms are not justified or are based on insufficient data or insufficient realization of any other action which might have been undertaken in the past.

" We have stated fairly clearly in the past what our basic attitude towards Hyderabad is. Hyderabad, situated as it is, cannot conceivably be independent and India can never agree to it, whatever happens and whatever may be the consequences. This is not because of sentimental reasons and not because of an emotional approach to the problem but for highly practical reasons of geography and other reasons which will lead to incessant conflict. "

If Hyderabad was not to be independent in the real sense of the word—he was not talking about internal autonomy which in fact all the provinces and States and unions of States enjoyed—then it would have to become part of the Indian Union with exactly equal rights like any of the provinces or States or unions of States, and enjoying the same rights. It was not therefore a question of any kind of suppression of Hyderabad or a Hindu-Muslim question. It was a partnership with equal rights. If they left out independence and if there was no accession the alternative was only paramountcy. Paramountcy meant practically for the Indian Union as such to have all the rights which accession would confer on it without that free partnership of Hyderabad State in the Indian Union which gives Hyderabad a big share in shaping its own as well as India's destiny. So the alternatives were only accession or paramountcy.

Pandit Nehru said that in the process of reaching this end—accession—it might be that he would be compelled to take a step here or there in order to avoid conflict and to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem. But it would only be a temporary stage leading to the desired

goal. He made it clear that India as well as Indian States disliked paramountcy and its bad odour, because it would affect the whole conception of Indian States which were growing as free partners in the Indian Union. Thus paramountcy was ruled out and all that remained was accession............

Pandit Nehru referred to the Standstill Agreement in accordance with which India withdrew her Armed Forces which were stationed in the heart of Hyderabad. That in itself showed that India wished to honour the Standstill Agreement which, she thought, would lead in course of time to a peaceful settlement.

He condemned the activities and utterances of the leaders of the Ittehad and the Razakars. It was not a question of individuals speaking, but it would not do for responsible leaders of organizations intimately connected with the Government and in fact controlling the Government to make such speeches. He referred to a recent speech by Mr. Razvi in which he was reported to have said that Razakars would march to Delhi.

Pandit Nehru emphasised that the Government of India would certainly have been justified by all canons of national or international law to take action when this kind of military preparation and border attacks and speeches were made without any check or hindrance.

"Why did we not do so?" Pandit Nehru asked, and replied: "Generally speaking we refrained and we held our hand much to the disgust of many of our people and much to the disgust of the several Provincial Governments who themselves were suffering. We held our hand because we hoped to come to a peaceful settlement and because we had to think of all the possible consequences that might flow from any kind of action that we might take.

"We do not wish to be hustled because some irresponsible persons in Hyderabad were misbehaving. We do not look at Hyderabad State, in spite of what they say, as anything but a part of India. We do not think of Hindus and Muslims of Hyderabad State as anything else but Indians. We do not want to do anything which will bring sorrow and misery to the people in Hyderabad as will as outside.

Pandit Nehru said that so long as there was any chance for a peaceful settlement, the Government would be justified in adopting the policy he had set out above but at the same time he added: " I want to say clearly and plainly to the Indian people that this Government will, of course, stand up for the honour of Indian and the Indian people but it will also stand up for peace to the utmost because not only they

think it is the right policy but because we have some memory of what our great departed leader stood for. So now the Hyderabad Government have not accepted these terms though they still talk of carrying on negotiations..........

Asked what was to be the Government of India's policy now, the Prime Minister said that apart from trying to achieve the present agreement, there was an economic blockade to some extent, there was the tightening up of the border and instructions to Indian military to pursue the raiders even across the border to punish them. What other steps they would take must depend upon circumstances. But at the same time the Government would try to avoid, as much as possible, a big scale conflict.........

Pandit Nehru in conclusion appealed to the people of Hyderabad, especially the non-Muslims, not to leave Hyderabad. He was sorry that some of them showed a tendency to walk out of Hyderabad. They should remain there for it just did no good to them or anybody else. By walking out of Hyderabad they would be just playing into the hands of those who wished them ill.

Speech broadcast by His Excellency the Prime Minister of Hyderabad (Mir Laik Ali) from Deccan Radio, Hyderabad, on Friday, June 18.

MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN,

You will naturally be anxious to hear a few words from me after the weeks of prolonged suspense through which we have all passed. During this period my colleagues and I have strained every nerve and tried our very best to arrive at an honourable settlement with the Indian Union on the future Indo-Hyderabad relations. I am sorry to admit that, despite all our efforts, we have not been able to find a solution that could satisfy the Indian Union without seriously impairing the honour and dignity and the peace and prosperity of Hyderabad--a cause which is dearer to us than anything else in our lives.

The Government of India have all along taken the stand that the only basis of Indo-Hyderabad relationship can be "accession," preferably in form but positively in substance. We on our part always maintained that our objective is a free Hyderabad but, knowing as we do how we are geographically situated, surrounded on all sides by the Indian Union, and in consideration of other natural and historic affinities, we are ready to enter into an agreement by which we shall

be prepared to concede certain of our inherent rights to the Dominion of India for obvious practical reasons, so long as such an arrangement does not basically impair our independence and our dignity.

After protracted negotiations the Government of India came forward with three alternative proposals: first accession; second immediate responsible government on the lines determined by the Government of India; and, third, decision of the issue of our acceding to India or remaining independent by a general plebiscite under neutral observation. The first alternative, from the point of view of Hyderabad, was out of the question. The second is primarily an internal matter and could not be resolved on a basis to be determined by the Government of India.

In regard to the third our benign Ruler graciously agreed that, although it was entirely his prerogative, he would be willing to be guided by the popular will, to be determined under the general supervision of an independent international body such as the United Nations of the International Court of Justice. This decision perhaps came to India as an unexpected surprise and they could not entertain the possibility of the people of Hyderabad deciding ultimately to remain independent. The Government of India, therefore, came forward with the proposal that during the interim period, pending the verdict of the people, Hyderabad should accede in substance and should give responsible government on the lines determined by the Indian Union. It is obvious that there would not be much need left to hold any plebiscite thereafter. On these bases the Government of India suggested varying terms. The final draft Heads of Agreement and accompanying documents presented by the Government of India were released to the Press yesterday from Delhi. The Government of India, however, refused to discuss the alternative draft Heads of Agreement presented by Hyderabad. They expressed their inability even suitably to alter their draft to provide adequately for the essential interests of Hyderabad. The once torch-bearers and champions of freedom for all are now claiming to impose even paramountcy on Hyderabad. There was no alternative left for the Government of Hyderabad but to reject the proposals presented by the Indian Government.

Besides, of course, serving the true interests of Hyderabad, I on my part have always tried to take a detached view of the situation so as to find an equitable solution of Indo-Hyderabad problems Time and again I have said, both here and at Delhi, that mutual suspicion and fear are the principal screens between the Indian Union and Hyderabad and that, if they are removed, it should be comparatively easy to find a satisfactory solution. Time after time, I have told them at Delhi that they cannot expect an unreserved gesture of friend-

ship from Hyderabad when the Government of India are operating a total economic blockade, are encouraging subversive activities and are continuously carrying on by press and radio the most malicious propaganda against Hyderabad. I told them that, if Delhi would only extend one hand of friendship, Hyderabad would receive it with both hands. But the powers at Delhi paid no heed to my advice.

Hyderabad knows that the Indian Union is a mighty power, that it is in a greatly advantageous position geographically and economically and finds itself in a superior position in every respect. Delhi has also repeatedly conveyed to Hyderabad that, through India's superior force and dominating position, they will compel and coerce Hyderabad to submit. To face these odds, Hyderabad's resources are obviously inadequate. But Hyderabad has a tremendous moral force in its favour —the force based on truth and founded on honour. I am glad to note that the people of Hyderabad have exhibited an astonishing determination to sacrifice their all to safeguard their independence. I am certain that their tremendous moral force and determination to uphold the cause of truth and honour and their unshakable faith in God Almighty cannot easily be overcome by any power. We have no ill-will against the Indian Union or any one else. We wish to be India's friends and can be very helpful friends. But Hyderabad, God willing, will never surrender its freedom and honour to any coercion or force.

Now, my countrymen, this stand of Hyderabad may involve severe hardships, risks and privations for you. Although there is not much room left for it to be made more severe. I am told the blockade against Hyderabad may be intensified still more. You will have to face all that and perhaps more and prove your worth. In this hour of trial you must not deviate one inch from the cause of righteousness and honour and dignity. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Sikhs and others—they are all the sons of the soil. The interest of one is the concern of the others. Let there not be a single occasion for any member of one community in any way to show the slightest disrespect or disregard to the person, property or the interest of the other. Otherwise we shall have polluted our fair name and shall have disgraced our noble and righteous cause. Also let no member of any community show disregard in any way to the larger interests of the State. Any who falter or fail in these respects shall be deemed to be the enemies of the State and will be severely dealt with. When we have secured—and, God willing, we shall secure it before long—an honourable and dignified place for Hyderabad, that acquisition will be the common property and common concern of every member of every community equally and fairly. I wish to make it clear on this occasion that we have no malice or any ill-will towards the people of the Dominion of India or the Provinces surrounding us. We know how most of them

are undergoing hardships, poverty, sufferings and other human miseries. We wish them well. If we are in a position to help them we shall always be glad to do so. If we are in need of their help we shall not hesitate to ask it. Our traditional regard for our neighbours will always be there. Our stand is solely based on our right to maintain our freedom, our dignity and our honour.

Finally, I would request all the services, Civil, Military and Police, to perform their respective duties with impartiality, courage, dignity, resoucefulness and determination. I would appeal to the public and to every citizen to go about their normal occupation with confidence. The combined efforts of all and our steadfast loyalty to our Ruler will God willing, soon carry us to our cherished goal.

May God Almighty give you all courage, endurance and honesty of purpose and bestow upon you soon lasting success, peace and prosperity.

Long Live the Nizam
Long Live Hyderabad
God Bless you All.

Telegram, dated June 18, 1948, from the Governor-General of India to the Nizam.

I acknowledge Your Exalted Highness' telegrams of sixteenth and seventeenth June [STOP] In view of my immediate demission of office I have handed these over to my Government.
